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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a modal theory iHσ which is sound and complete for arithmetical
Σ1-interpretations in HA, in other words, we will show that iHσ is the Σ1-provability logic of
HA. Moreover we will show that iHσ is decidable. As a by-product of these results, we show
that HA+ ✷⊥ has de Jongh property.
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1 Introduction
As far as we know, there are at least two updated reliable sources [AB04, BV06] for current situation,
historical background and motivations for provability logic. To be self-contained, in this introduction,
we extract a brief backgrounds of provability logic from the mentioned sources for readers not much
familiar with the subject.
Provability Logic is a modal logic in which the modal operator ✷ has intended meaning of
provability in some formal system. Unlike the other realms of modal logic, e.g. temporal logic,
epistemic logic and deontic logic, here in provability logic, we have a rational meaning for ✷A:
“A is provable in the system T ”
The notion of provability logic goes back essentially to K. Go¨del [Go¨d33] in 1933, where he
intended to provide a semantics for Heyting’s formalization of intuitionistic logic IPC. He defined a
translation, or interpretation τ from the propositional language to the modal language such that
IPC ⊢ A ⇐⇒ S4 ⊢ τ(A).
The translation τ(A) adds a ✷ before each sub-formula of A. The idea behind this translation is
hidden in the intuitionistic meaning of truth (the BHK interpretation): “The truth of a proposition
coincides with its provability”. Hence if one assumes ✷A as “provability of A”, then it is reasonable
to add a ✷ behind each sub-formula and expect to have a correspondence between the intuitionistic
propositional calculus IPC and some classical modal logic.
On the other hand, by works of Go¨del in [Go¨d31], for each arithmetical formula A and recursively
axiomatizable theory T (like PA), we can formalize the statement “there exists a proof in T for A”
by a sentence of the language of arithmetic, i.e. ProvT (pAq) := ∃xProofT (x, pAq), where pAq is the
code of A. Now the question is whether we can find some modal propositional theory such that the
 operator captures the notion of provability in classical mathematics. Let us restrict our attention
to the part of mathematics known as Peano Arithmetic PA. Hence the question is to find some
propositional modal theory T✷ such that:
T✷ ⊢ A ⇐⇒ ∀∗ PA ⊢ A
∗
By ( )∗, we mean a mapping from the modal language to the first-order language of arithmetic, such
that
• p∗ is an arithmetical first-order sentence, for any atomic variable p, and ⊥∗ = ⊥,
• (A ◦B)∗ = A∗ ◦B∗, for ◦ ∈ {∨,∧,→},
• (A)∗ := ∃xProofPA (x, pA∗q).
It turned out that S4 is not a right candidate for interpreting the notion of provability, since
¬⊥ is a theorem of S4, contradicting Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem (Peano Arthmetic
PA, does not prove its own consistency).
In 1976, R. Solovay [Sol76] proved that the right modal logic, in which the  operator interprets
the notion of provability in PA, is GL. This modal logic is well-known as the Go¨del-Lo¨b logic, and
has the following axioms and rules:
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• all tautologies of classical propositional logic,
• ✷(A→ B)→ (✷A→ ✷B),
• ✷A→ ✷✷A,
• Lo¨b’s axiom (L): ✷(✷A→ A)→ ✷A,
• Necessitation Rule: A/✷A,
• Modus ponens: (A,A→ B)/B.
Theorem. (Solovay) For any sentence A in the language of modal logic, GL ⊢ A if and only if for
all interpretations ( )∗, PA ⊢ A∗.
There are many open problems which could be assumed as a generalization of the above theorem.
A list of such problems could be found in [BV06]. Also a live list of open problems could be found
in the homepage of Lev Beklemishev1.
The question of generalizing Solovay’s result from classical theories to intuitionistic ones, such as
the intuitionistic counterpart of PA, well-known as Heyting Arithmetic HA, proved to be remarkably
difficult [AB04]. This problem was taken up by A. Visser, D. de Jongh and their students. The
problem of axiomatizing the provability logic of HA remains a major open problem since the end of
70s [AB04]. Precisely speaking, the problem of the provability logic of HA is as follows:
Find a modal theory iH such that: iH ⊢ A ⇐⇒ ∀∗ HA ⊢ A∗
Note that in the above statement of the provability logic of HA, we have (✷A)∗ := Prov
HA
(pA∗q).
The following list contains important results about the provability logic of HA with arithmetical
nature:
• Myhill 1973 and Friedman 1975. iH 0 ✷(A ∨B)→ (✷A ∨✷B), [Myh73, Fri75]
• Leivant 1975. iH ⊢ ✷(A∨B)→ ✷(✷.A∨ ✷.B), in which ✷.A is a shorthand for A∧✷A, [Lei75]
• Visser 1981. iH ⊢ ✷¬¬✷A→ ✷✷A and iH ⊢ ✷(¬¬✷A→ ✷A)→ ✷(✷A∨¬✷A), [Vis81, Vis82]
• Iemhoff 2001. Introduced a uniform axiomatization of all known axiom schemas of iH in an
extended language with a bimodal operator ✄. In her Ph.D. dissertation [Iem01], Iemhoff
raised a conjecture that implies directly that her axiom system, iPH, restricted to the normal
modal language, is equal to iH, [Iem01]
• Visser 2002. Introduced a decision algorithm for iH ⊢ A, for all A not containing any atomic
variable. [Vis02]
In this paper, we introduce an axiomatization of a modal logic iHσ and prove the following result
which partially answers the question.
We first show that any TNNIL-proposition2 A is in the Σ1-provability logic of HA, iff iGL+CP ⊢ A,
where iGL is the intuitionistic Go¨del-Lo¨b’s logic and CP is the completeness principle B → ✷B (we
call this theory as LC). This fact in combination with the conservativity result of Theorem 4.24 and
also some variant of Visser’s NNIL-algorithm in [Vis02], implies that the Σ1-provability logic of HA,
is a decidable modal theory, that is called iHσ here. More precisely, we find a system iHσ such that
iHσ ⊢ A ⇐⇒ ∀∗ HA ⊢ A
∗,
1http://www.mi.ras.ru/~bekl
2 We say that A is TNNIL, if any two nested occurrences of → in the left are separated by a ✷. For example
(p → q) → r and ¬(p → q) are not TNNIL, while p → q and ✷(p → q) → r are TNNIL. Precise definition of
TNNIL-propositions, a modal variant of NNIL-propositions [VvBdJRdL95], is in Section 4.1.2.
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in which, ∗ range over all of the interpretations that p∗ is a Σ1-sentence for atomic variables p. The
complete axiomatization of iHσ is in Section 4.3. It is worth mentioning that a non-modal variant for
all of the axioms of iHσ, were already discovered by Visser in [Vis81, Vis82, Vis02]. He also showed
in [Vis02] that those variant of axioms of iHσ are sound for Σ1 arithmetical interpretations in HA.
1.1 Inspiring examples
In the following four examples, we roughly explain the main roads in the paper. Before we continue
with examples, let us review what we are going to do in this paper. Our main results are soundness
and completeness theorems of iHσ for arithmetical Σ1-interpretations in HA. As usual, the difficult
part is the completeness theorem. The soundness part is not problematic: some major part of
soundness is already done by Visser [Vis02] and the rest (extended Leivant’s principle) is done in
Theorem 3.19. We are not going to talk about soundness in these examples. We explain how to
refute some modal proposition A from the Σ1-provability logic (and a fortiori from the provability
logic) of HA, i.e. we will find some Σ1-interpretation σHA such that HA 0 σHA(A). The propositions
which we treat here are (p → q) ∨ (q → p), ✷(p ∨ q) → (✷p ∨ ✷q), ¬¬✷(¬¬p → p) → ✷(¬¬p→ p)
and finally A := ✷(p ∨ q)→ [(✷p→ (p ∨ q ∨ ✷q)) ∨ (✷q → (p ∨ q ∨ ✷p))].
Example 1.1. In this example we will show that how to refute the Dummet formula A := (p→ q)∨
(q → p) from the Σ1-provability logic of HA. Since A is non-modal, we are actually faced with a
special case of proving de Jongh property for HA with Σ1-substitutions. C. Smoryn´sk first discovered
this result [Smo73a]. For a survey on the de Jongh property see [dJVV11]. Here we explain how to
use Solovey’s method [Sol76] in combination with Smory´nski’s general method for defining first-order
Kripke models of HA [Smo73b, page 372] to deduce the de Jongh property (with Σ1-substitutions)
for HA. We are not going to provide all details here, instead we explain the idea which motivated
us to our main result Theorem 5.1. First we find a Kripke model K0 1 A:
β  p , β 1 q , γ  q , γ 1 p
α ≤ β, γ , α 1 p, q
In the left and right hand side of each node we wrote the name of that node and the set of atomic
variables which are forced at that node, respectively. The precise definition of Kripke models for
intuitionistic propositional logic IPC, came in Section 4.5.
Next we will find some arithmetical Σ1-sentences B and C and also a first-order Kripke model
K1  HA such that K1 simulates K0, with B and C playing the role of p and q, respectively:
simulation for all nodes
In the above picture, Mα, Mβ and Mγ are classical structures assigned to the corresponding nodes.
For definition of intuitionistic first-order Kripke models, see Section 3.1.2.
To explain what are these classical structures and also what are the sentences B and C, we first
define a recursive function F with the domain of natural numbers and with the range in the nodes
of the Kripke model. Let us define:
B := ∃x(F (x) = β) and C := ∃x(F (x) = γ)
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Since F is a recursive function, B and C are Σ1 sentences. Moreover, for any δ ∈ {α, β, γ}, we
assume the classical structures Mδ such that
Mδ |= Tδ , Tδ := PA+ ( lim
x→∞
F (x) = δ)
In which limx→∞F (x) = δ is defined as ∃x∀y ≥ xF (y) = δ. The function F is defined as follows:
F (0) := α0 and F (n + 1) is defined to be some node δ > F (n), if there exists some proof (in PA)
with the Go¨del number less than n+ 1 for the statement
lim
x→∞
F (x) 6= δ
In other words, F climbs at stage n + 1 to the node δ if there is a witness for the inconsistency of
Tδ. This function is the same as the Solovey’s function in [Sol76]. The recursive definition of F is
such that although it is true that F is a constant function, PA can’t prove it. Moreover, F is such
that for any pair of nodes δ  δ′, we have Tδ ⊢ Con(Tδ′), i.e.
PA+ lim
x→∞
F (x) = δ ⊢ ¬Prov
PA
(p lim
x→∞
F (x) 6= δ′q)
This guaranties the existence of the classical structures Mδ |= Tδ, such that K1 is a first-order
Kripke model of HA (see [Smo73a, Smo73b]). From Mβ |= Tβ, we can deduce that K1, β  B and
K1, β 1 C. From Mγ |= Tγ , we can deduce K1, γ  C and K1, γ 1 B. These would imply that
K1, α 1 (B → C) ∨ (C → B), as desired.
Example 1.2. Let A = ✷(p ∨ q) → (✷p ∨ ✷q). J. Myhill [Myh73] and H. Friedman [Fri75]
have already shown that there exist some first-order arithmetical formulas B and C such that
HA 0 ✷(B ∨ C) → (✷B ∨ ✷C), in other words, there exist some arithmetical substitution σ such
that HA 0 σ
HA
(A), i.e. A does not belong to the provability logic of HA. However, their proof
does not provide an explicit B and C. It only guarantees the existence of such arithmetical propo-
sitions. With the methods of this paper, we will find some explicit sentences B and C such that
HA 0 ✷(B ∨C)→ (✷B ∨ ✷C).
As usual, we first find some Kripke model which refutes the proposition A. The Kripke models of
intuitionistic modal logic have two relations: one for intuitionistic logic (≤) which we illustrated it in
the pictures with one arrow in the middle line, and another relation for modal connective (R) which
is illustrated with two arrows in middle line. All Kripke models in this paper have the following
property: α ≤ βR γ implies αR γ. Also, in this example and other examples (Examples 1.1 to 1.4),
the relations R and ≤ are transitive, R ⊆ ≤ and moreover,R is irreflexive and ≤ is reflexive. In the
pictures, we do not draw all the relations and always we assume the colsure of relations under the
mentioned properties for the relations. For precise definition of Kripke semantics for intuitionistic
modal logics, see Section 4.5. The Kripke counter-model for A is K0:
β  p , β 1 q , γ  q , γ 1 p
αRβ,γ , α ≤ β, γ
α0Rα, β,γ , α0 ≤ α, β, γ , α, α0 1 p, q
As it may be observed, the node α0 is not necessary. We add this extra (root) node, whenever
we are not able to simulate the behaviour of the existing root of the tree. Theorem 4.26 ensures us
that always for invalid propositions, such Kripke models exist. Next we will find some arithmetical
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sentences B and C and also a first-order Kripke model K1  HA such that K1 simulates K0 with B
and C playing the role of p and q, respectively:
simulation for all nodes
except for       
In the above picture, Mα, Mβ and Mγ are classical structures assigned to the corresponding nodes
and N indicates the standard model of arithmetic. To explain these classical structures and also the
sentences B and C, we first define a recursive function F with the domain of natural numbers and
with the range in the nodes of the Kripke model. Let us define:
B := ∃x(F (x) = β) and C := ∃x(F (x) = γ)
Moreover, for any δ ∈ {α, β, γ}, we assume the classical structures Mδ such that
(1.1) Mδ |= Tδ, Tδ := PA+ ( lim
x→∞
F (x) = δ) +Prov
HA
(pϕ
δ
q), ϕ
α
:= B ∨C, ϕ
β
:= ϕ
γ
:= B ∧C
Note that Mδ |= ProvHA(pϕδq), and this implies K1, δ  ProvHA(pϕδq). This means that the node
δ in the first-order Kripke model forces the interpretation of those boxed propositions which are
forced at δ in the propositional Kripke model K0. As we will see in Corollary 5.23:
PA+ ( lim
x→∞
F (x) = δ) ⊢ Prov
HA
(pϕ
δ
q)
Hence we may define Tδ simply as PA + (limx→∞F (x) = δ), instead of our previous definition in
eq. (1.1).
The function F is defined as follows: F (0) := α0 and F (n + 1) is defined to be some node δ
such that F (n)R δ, if there exists some proof (in PA) with the Go¨del number less than n+1 for the
statement
¬[ lim
x→∞
F (x) = δ ∧ Prov
HA
(pϕ
δ
q)]
Otherwise define F (n + 1) := F (n). In other words, F climbs at stage n + 1 to the node δ if
there is a witness for the inconsistency of Tδ with ProvHA(pϕδq). What is ϕδ? The proposition ϕδ
is the conjunction of all propositions E such that ✷E is forced at δ. Since the number of such
propositions are infinite, we only take care of those E which are important to us, i.e. those which
are a sub-formula of A. Without ϕ
δ
, the function F becomes exactly what Solovay used to prove
his completeness theorems for GL [Sol76], as we used in Example 1.1. This is not enough for our
aim. We need to have Tα ⊢ ProvHA(pB ∨Cq) and generally, Tδ ⊢ ProvHA(pϕδq), which is not the case
without the clause of ϕ
δ
in the recursive definition of F .
By arguments in Section 5, there exists some classical structures Mδ |= Tδ such that K1 is a
first-order Kripke model of HA. This implies that Mβ |= B, Mβ 6|= C, Mγ |= C and Mγ 6|= B. Since
Tα ⊢ ProvHA(pB ∨Cq), we can deduce that Mα |= ProvHA(pB ∨Cq). Also it is easy to show that for
any first-order Kripke model K  HA, any node δ and arbitrary Σ1-sentence E, we have
K, δ  E ⇐⇒ Mδ |= E
Since Prov(x) is a Σ1-predicate, we can deduce K1, α  ProvHA(pB ∨Cq) and K1, α 1 ProvHA(pBq)∨
Prov
HA
(pCq). Hence K1 1 ProvHA(pB ∨ Cq) → (ProvHA(pBq) ∨ ProvHA(pCq)), as desired. We will
consider this proposition (A) again in Example 6.1 and refute it from Σ1-provability logic of HA
with the direct use of our main theorem in Section 5.
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Example 1.3. In this example, we show that how to refute A = ¬¬✷(¬¬p → p) → ✷(¬¬p → p)
from the provability logic of HA and also from the Σ1-provability logic of HA. In this example, the
TNNIL algorithm is involved.
The first thing is that we cannot directly refute A from the provability logic of HA as we did in
Examples 1.1 and 1.2. The difficulty comes from the nested implications in the left hand side which
are not separated by a ✷. Note that ¬p is a shorthand for p → ⊥. To overcome this difficulty, we
iteratively use Visser’s NNIL (No Nested Implication to the Left) approximation [Vis02] in the modal
language, i.e. inside any ✷ we compute the best NNIL approximation from below and replace it
for the proposition. The approximated proposition for any modal proposition E is denoted in this
paper by E+. Some of Visser’s NNIL approximations are [Vis02]:
(¬¬p)+ = p , (¬¬p→ p)+ = p ∨ ¬p , ((p→ q)→ r)+ = r ∨ (p ∧ (q → r))
The process of computing the approximation (.)+ is complicated and we do not precisely define it
in this example. It is explained in details in Section 4.1. We may briefly describe it in the following
way.
Let A be a non-modal proposition. Its NNIL approximation A+, is some proposition with no
nested implications to the left such that IPC ⊢ A+ → A, and for any other NNIL proposition B such
that IPC ⊢ B → A, we have IPC ⊢ B → A+. It is clear that, up to IPC-deductive equivalency, such
an approximation is unique.
We have the following approximation for A:
A+ = ✷(p ∨ ¬p) ∨ ¬✷(p ∨ ¬p)
Now we can handle this simplified proposition A+ as we did in Examples 1.1 and 1.2. The following
Kripke model K0 is a counter-model for A+:
α0, α, β 1 p γ  p and
αRβ, γ α ≤ β, γ β ≤ γ βR γ
α0Rα, β, γ α0 ≤ α, β, γ
One can define the recursive function F exactly the same as Example 1.2 with new definitions
for ϕ
δ
and B:
ϕ
α
:= ⊤ , ϕ
β
= ϕ
γ
:= B ∨ ¬B , B := (∃xF (x) = γ)
Then we can define the first-order Kripke model K1  HA which simulates K0 in a same way as
Example 1.2. Then we can deduce that K1 1 ProvHA(pB ∨¬Bq)∨¬ProvHA(pB ∨¬Bq). Although we
have refuted ✷(p ∨ ¬p)→ ¬✷(p ∨ ¬p) from the Σ1-provability logic of HA, the proposition A is not
refuted yet. But the key point here is that by Visser’s Rule, we have HA ⊢ ¬¬Prov
HA
(p¬¬B → Bq)→
Prov
HA
(p¬¬B → Bq) if and only if HA ⊢ Prov
HA
(p¬¬B → Bq) ∨ ¬Prov
HA
(p¬¬B → Bq). And also
by formalized Visser’s Rule, we have:
HA ⊢ Prov
HA
(pB ∨ ¬Bq)↔ Prov
HA
(p¬¬B → Bq)
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This will finish the refutation process, i.e. HA 0 ¬¬Prov
HA
(p¬¬B → Bq) → Prov
HA
(p¬¬B → Bq).
The Visser’s Rule says that for any Σ1-sentence B, we have HA ⊢ ¬¬B → B iff HA ⊢ B ∨ ¬B. The
proof of this rule first appeared in [Vis81] (see Corollary 4.8 item 1).
We will consider this proposition (A) again in Example 6.2 and refute it from Σ1-provability
logic of HA with the direct use of our main theorem in Section 5.
In all of the Examples 1.1 to 1.3, the relation for modal operator did not play an independent
role, i.e. R and ≤ either where equal (Examples 1.2 and 1.3) or could be defined as equal relations
(Example 1.1). This made too much simplifications in the definition of the recursive function F . In
the following example, there exist some α and β such that α ≤ β but it is not the case that αRβ.
Example 1.4. In this example we refute the modal proposition
A := ✷(p ∨ q)→ [(✷p→ (p ∨ q ∨ ✷q)) ∨ (✷q → (p ∨ q ∨ ✷p))]
Like Examples 1.1 and 1.2, we first find a Kripke counter-model K0 1 A:
γ1  p γ2  q
α0, α, β1, β2, γ2 1 p α0, α, β1, β2, γ1 1 q
α0 ≤ α, β1, β2, γ1, γ2 α0Rα, β1, β2, γ1, γ2
α ≤ β1, β2, γ1, γ2 αR γ1, γ2 βi ≤ γi βiR γi
αRβ1 αRβ2
We simulate this Kripke model with a first-order Kripke model K1  HA:
simulation for all nodes
except for 
We define the Σ1-sentences B and C and also the sentences ϕδ for any δ 6= α0 like before:
B := (∃xF (x) = γ1) C := (∃xF (x) = γ2) ϕα := B ∨ C ϕβ1 := B ϕβ2 := C
(1.2) ϕ
γ1
:= ϕ
γ2
:= B ∧ C Mδ |= Tδ Tδ := PA+ lim
x→∞
F (x) = δ + Prov
HA
(pϕ
δ
q)
The recursive definition of F is more complicated than previous examples. This is because we
have really two different relations: ≤ andR. The clause in recursive definition of F for the treatment
of R is as before. For ≤ we use a variant of Berarducci’s primitive recursive function in [Ber90]
which he used for characterizing the interpretability logic of PA.
We define F (0) := α0. Assume that we have defined F (n) := δ, and we will define F (n+ 1) := δ
′ if
one of the following cases occurs, otherwise we define F (n+ 1) := F (n) = δ.
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• δR δ′ and there exists some witness ( which is less than or equal to n+1) for the inconsistency
of Tδ′ , or in other words, there exists some proof (in PA) with the Go¨del number ≤ n+ 1 for
the statement
¬[ lim
x→∞
F (x) = δ′ ∧ Prov
HA
(pϕ
δ′
q)]
• All of the following conditions hold:
– δRδ′ and δ ≤ δ′,
– There exists some witness (which is less than or equal to n+ 1) for the inconsistency of
Tδ′ ,
– The inconsistency rank of Tδ′ (we call it r(δ
′, n+ 1)) is less than the inconsistency rank
of Tδ (we call it r(δ, n+ 1)),
– F (r(δ′, n+ 1))R δ.
The inconsistency rank of Tδ is defined to be the minimum k such that there exists a witness
(less than or equal to n+ 1) for the inconsistency of
PAk + lim
x→∞
F (x) = δ + Prov
HA
(pϕ
δ
q)
In above definition, PAk is the theory IΣ1 plus induction axiom for those formulas with Go¨del
number less than k.
The crucial fact about the function F is that F would not climb over tree (see Theorem 5.26). This
fact is crucial for proving that the first-order Kripke model K1  HA exists such that it fulfils the
conditions in eq. (1.2). By Corollary 5.23, we have
Tδ ⊢ ProvHA(pϕδq) for any δ 6= α0
To simplify notations, we use ✷A instead of Prov
HA
(pAq) for arithmetical formula A. Hence we have
Mα |= ✷(B ∨ C) Mβ1 |= ✷B Mβ2 |= ✷C Mγ1 |= B Mγ2 |= C
Moreover, we have
Mβ1 6|= B,C Mβ2 6|= B,C
We need two more conditions to deduce that
K1 1 ✷(B ∨ C)→ [(✷B → (B ∨ C ∨ ✷C)) ∨ (✷C → (B ∨ C ∨ ✷B))]
These two conditions are Mβ1 6|= ✷C and Mβ2 6|= ✷B. We will show in Theorem 5.15 that these
conditions hold as well. The proof of this fact take up all Section 5.3 and there, we use Lemma 3.18
which is the essential result in Section 3.
Why ≤ is not treated like R in recursive definition of F? Because if we do so, we are not able
to prove that the function F is constant (Theorem 5.26) and even the consistency of L = α0 and
consequently the consistency of all the theories Tδ will be lost.
1.2 What happens in classical case
The main result of this paper in classical case, i.e. the Σ1-provability logic of PA is already char-
acterized by A. Visser [Vis81] and is remarkably simpler than the intuitionistic case. A. Visser
showed:
GLV ⊢ A ⇐⇒ ∀∗ PA ⊢ A∗,
in which, ∗ ranges over all of the interpretations that p∗ is a Σ1-sentence for atomic variables p
and GLV is GL plus the completeness axiom for atomic variables: p → ✷p. For a proof of this fact
see [Boo95] page 135. It is shown [AM15] that the provability logic of PA could be reduced to its
Σ1-provability logic.
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1.3 Map of sections
Let us explain the content of sections and their interrelationship. All of the contents of this paper
are minimally chosen for one major goal: soundness and completeness of iHσ for arithmetical Σ1-
interpretations, i.e. Theorems 6.3 and 6.5. In Section 2, we give definitions of some elementary
notions and also make some conventions. In Section 3, we gather all the required statements with
arithmetical nature. Most of the lemmas and definitions are for proving a refinement of Leivant’s
principle in Lemma 3.18 (or its simplified form in Theorem 3.14). This will be used in Section 5. In
Section 4, we collect all required notions with propositional nature. The most crucial fact we will
show in this section is that in iHσ (precise axiomatization of iHσ will come in Section 4.3), one could
transform any modal proposition A to another proposition A+ with simpler form, which is called
TNNIL in this paper. Roughly speaking, in a TNNIL-formula, every two nested implications in the
left hand side are separated by a ✷. This is done in Theorem 4.18 and Corollary 4.19. Then we
show that the theory LC (intuitionistic version of GL plus the axiom schema A → ✷A) is TNNIL-
conservative over iHσ (Theorem 4.24). It turns out that LC and iHσ actually prove same TNNIL
modal propositions (Corollary 6.4). Moreover, it is shown in Theorem 4.26 that LC is sound and
complete for a special class of finite Kripke models (perfect Kripke models). In Section 5, we show
that one could transform a finite Kripke model of LC (with tree-frame) to a first-order Kripke model
of HA (Theorem 5.1). This transformation is such that there is a natural correspondence between
these two Kripke models. Finally in Section 6, we use the results of Sections 3, 4 and 5, to prove
the soundness and completeness of iHσ for arithmetical Σ1-interpretations.
2 Definitions and conventions
The propositional non-modal languageL0 contains atomic variables, ∨,∧,→,⊥ and the propositional
modal language, L✷ has an additional operator ✷. In this paper, the atomic propositions (in modal
or non-modal language) includes atomic variables and ⊥. For an arbitrary proposition A, Sub(A) is
defined to be the set of all sub-formulae of A, including A itself. We take Sub(X) :=
⋃
A∈X Sub(A)
for a set of propositions X . We use ✷.A as a shorthand for A ∧ ✷A. The logic IPC is intuitionistic
propositional non-modal logic over usual propositional non-modal language. The theory IPC✷ is
the same theory IPC in the extended language of propositional modal language, i.e. its language is
propositional modal language and its axioms and rules are same as IPC . Because we have no axioms
for ✷ in IPC✷, it is obvious that ✷A for each A, behaves exactly like an atomic variable inside IPC✷.
First-order intuitionistic logic is denoted IQC and the logic CQC is its classical closure, i.e. IQC plus
the principle of excluded middle. For a set of sentences and rules Γ ∪ {A} in the propositional non-
modal, propositional modal or first-order language, Γ ⊢ A means that A is derivable from Γ in the
system IPC, IPC✷, IQC, respectively. For an arithmetical formula, pAq represents the Go¨del number
of A. For an arbitrary arithmetical theory T with a set of ∆0- axioms, we have the ∆0-predicate
ProofT (x, pAq), that is a formalization of “x is the code of a proof for A in T ”. We also have the
provability predicate ProvT (pAq) := ∃x ProofT (x, pAq). The set of natural numbers is denoted by
ω := {0, 1, 2, . . .}.
Definition 2.1. Suppose T is a recursively enumerable (r.e.) arithmetical theory and σ is a substi-
tution i.e. a function from atomic variables to arithmetical sentences. We define the interpretation
σ
T
which extend the substitution σ to all modal propositions A, inductively:
• σ
T
(A) := σ(A) for atomic A,
• σ
T
distributes over ∧,∨,→,
• σ
T
(✷A) := Prov
T
(pσ
T
(A)q).
We call σ a Σ1-substitution, if for every atomic A, σ(A) is a Σ1-sentence. We also say that σT is
a Σ1-interpretation if σ is a Σ1-substitution.
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Definition 2.2. The provability logic of a sufficiently strong theory T , is defined to be a modal
propositional theory PL(T ) such that PL(T ) ⊢ A iff for all arithmetical substitutions σ, T ⊢ σ
T
(A).
If we restrict the substitutions to Σ1-substitutions, then the new modal theory is PLσ(T ).
Lemma 2.3. Let A(p1, . . . , pn) be a non-modal proposition with pi 6= pj for all 0 < i < j ≤ n. Then
for all modal sentences B1, . . . , Bn we have:
IPC ⊢ A iff IPC✷ ⊢ A[p1|✷B1, . . . , pn|✷Bn]
Proof. By simple inductions on complexity of proofs in IPC and IPC✷. ✷
We define NOI (No Outside Implication) as the set of modal propositions A, such that any occurrence
of → is in the scope of some ✷. To be able to state an extension of Leivant’s Principle (that is
adequate to axiomatize Σ1-provability logic of HA) we need a translation on the modal language
which we call Leivant’s translation. We define it recursively as follows:
• Al := A for atomic or boxed A,
• (A ∧B)l := Al ∧Bl.
• (A ∨B)l := ✷.Al ∨ ✷.Bl.
• (A→ B)l is defined by cases: If A ∈ NOI, we define (A→ B)l := A→ Bl, otherwise we define
(A→ B)l := A→ B.
Definition 2.4. Minimal provability logic iGL, is the same as Go¨del-Lo¨b provability logic GL , with
all tautologies of intuitionistic logic (in modal language) instead of tautologies of classical logic. iK4
is iGL without Lo¨b’s axiom. Note that we can get rid of the necessitation rule by adding ✷A to the
axioms, for each axiom A in the above list. We will use this fact later in this paper. We list the
following axiom schemas:
• The Completeness Principle: CP := A→ ✷A.
• Restriction of Completeness Principle to atomic formulae: CPa := p→ ✷p, for atomic p.
• Leivant’s Principle: Le := ✷(B ∨ C)→ ✷(✷B ∨ C). [Lei75]
• Extended Leivant’s Principle: Le+ := ✷A→ ✷Al.
We define theories LC := iGL+ CP and LLe+ := iGL+ Le+ + CPa. Note that in the presence of CP
and modus ponens, the necessitation rule is superfluous.
3 Arithmetic
In this section, we gather some preliminaries from intuitionistic arithmetic. Mostly we will prove
some refinements of well-known theorems such as: Π2-conservativity of PA over HA, Go¨del’s diag-
nolization lemma and Σ1-completeness of HA. Most of these preliminaries will be used to prove a
refinement of Leivant’s principle ✷(A ∨ B) → ✷(✷.A ∨ ✷.B) in the technical Lemma 3.17. Theo-
rem 3.14 states a simplified version of Lemma 3.17.
3.1 Some arithmetical preliminaries
The first-order language of arithmetic contains three functions (successor, addition and multiplica-
tion), one predicate symbol and a constant: (S,+, .,≤, 0). First-order intuitionistic arithmetic (HA)
is the theory over IQC with the axioms:
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Q1 S(x) 6= 0,
Q2 S(x) = S(y)→ x = y,
Q3 y = 0 ∨ ∃x S(x) = y,
Q4 x+ 0 = x,
Q5 x+ S(y) = S(x+ y),
Q6 x.0 = 0,
Q7 x.S(y) = (x.y) + x,
Q8 x ≤ y ↔ ∃z(z + x = y),
Ind: For each formula A(x):
Ind(A, x) := UC[A(0) ∧ ∀x(A(x)→ A(S(x)))] → ∀xA(x)]
In which UC(B) is the universal closure of B.
Peano Arithmetic PA, has the same axioms of HA over CQC. We also define x < y as x ≤ y ∧ x 6= y.
Let T be an r.e. theory with the set of axiomsA1, A2, . . .. It is known in the literature (see e.g. [Ber90,
section 2.3] or [Vis02, section 8.1]) that Tn indicates the theory with the first n axioms of T , i.e.
A1, . . . An. In the following notation, we order the axioms of HA and PA in a way which best fit the
relevant lemmas and theorems in this paper.
Notation 3.1. From now on, when we are working in first-order language of arithmetic, for a first-
order sentence A, ✷A and ✷+A are shorthand for ProvHA (pAq) and ProvPA (pAq) , respectively. Let
iΣ1 be the theory HA, where the induction principle is restricted to Σ1-formulae. We also define the
theories HAx to be the theory with axioms of HA, in which the induction principle is restricted to
formulas satisfying at least one of the following conditions:
• formulas of the form (A→ B)→ B in which A and B are Σ1.
• formulas with Go¨del number less than x.
We can define similar concept for PAx. Note that classically, a formula of the form (A→ B)→ B
in which A and B are Σ1, is equivalent to the Σ1-formula A ∨ B and hence PA0 is the well-known
theory IΣ1. We also define ✷xA and ✷
+
xA to be ProvHAx (pAq) and ProvPAx (pAq), respectively.
We recall that a function f on ω := {0, 1, 2, . . .} is recursive iff there exists some Σ1-formula Af (x¯, y)
such that N |= Af (x¯, y) iff f(x¯) = y. It is called provably total in T , iff T ⊢ ∀x¯∃yAf (x¯, y).
It is well known that all primitive recursive functions are provably total in IΣ1 with a ∆0-formula
as defining formula. So we may use primitive recursive function symbols in the language of arithmetic
with their defining axioms (as far as we work in IΣ1).
Lemma 3.2. Let A, B be Σ1-formulae such that PA ⊢ A→ B. Then HA ⊢ A→ B.
Proof. Let PA ⊢ A → B. Then as it is well known in classical logic, we have PA ⊢ ¬A ∨ B.
Since A and B are Σ1, there are some ∆0 formulas A
′(x) and B′(y) such that A = ∃xA′(x) and
B = ∃yB′(y). We may assume that x is not free in B′ and y is not free in A′. Hence we may deduce
that PA ⊢ ∃y(¬A′(x) ∨B′(y)). By Π2-conservativity of PA over HA [TvD88](3.3.4), we can deduce
that HA ⊢ ∃y(¬A′(x)∨B′(y)). Then we may deduce that HA ⊢ ∃y(A′(x)→ B′(y)) and hence (since
y is not free in A′) HA ⊢ A′(x)→ B and by generalization rule HA ⊢ ∀x(A′(x)→ B). This implies
that HA ⊢ A→ B (since x is not free B). ✷
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Lemma 3.3. For any ∆0-formula A(x¯), we have HA0 ⊢ ∀x¯(A(x¯) ∨ ¬A(x¯)).
Proof. This is well-known in the literature. ✷
The Go¨del-Gentzen translation associates a formula Ag for any formula A in a first-order language,
and is defined inductively by the following items:
• Ag := A, for atomic A,
• (A ∧B)g := Ag ∧Bg,
• (A ∨B)g := ¬(¬Ag ∧ ¬Bg),
• (A→ B)g := Ag → Bg,
• (∀xA)g := ∀xAg ,
• (∃xA)g := ¬¬∃xAg .
The Friedman translation associates a formula AC , for an arbitrary formula C and A in first-order
language. Roughly speaking, AC is the result of adding C as a disjunct to all atomic sub-formulas
of A. To define AC , we assume that free variables of C do not appear as bound variables of A. It
is obvious that we can always take care of this detail by renaming bound variables of A to fresh
variables.
• AC := A ∨ C, for atomic A,
• (A ∧B)C := AC ∧BC ,
• (A ∨B)C := AC ∨BC ,
• (A→ B)C := AC → BC ,
• (∀xA)C := ∀xAC ,
• (∃xA)C := ∃xAC .
As shown in [TvD88], we have the following properties for Go¨del-Gentzen and Friedman trans-
lations:
• For each Σ1-formulaA in the language of arithmetic, HA ⊢ Ag ↔ ¬¬A and HA ⊢ AC ↔ (A∨C).
• For any A in the language of arithmetic, CQC ⊢ A implies IQC ⊢ Ag.
• HA0 is closed under Friedman’s translation with respect to Σ1-formulas. i.e. for any Σ1-formula
B and any A, HA0 ⊢ A implies HA0 ⊢ AB . Actually in [TvD88], this property is proved for
HA instead of HA0, but this case is very similar to that one.
We have the following variant of Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 3.4. For any Σ1-formula A, PA0 ⊢ A implies HA0 ⊢ A. Hence for any Π2-sentence A,
PA0 ⊢ A implies HA0 ⊢ A.
Proof. First observe that PA0 ⊢ B implies HA0 ⊢ Bg, by induction on proof of B in PA0. We refer
the reader to [TvD88] for a detailed proof of this fact for PA and HA instead of PA0 and HA0. It
should only be noted that for any instance B of induction over Σ1 formulae in PA0, by definition
of Go¨del-Gentzen translation, Bg belongs to the axioms of HA0. Hence, we have HA0 ⊢ ¬¬A, and
thus HA0 ⊢ (¬¬A)A. This implies HA0 ⊢ A, as desired. ✷
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Consider the mapping:
F : n 7→ A(Sn(0)) := A(
n times︷ ︸︸ ︷
S . . . S(0))
Let G be the primitive recursive function that assigns to n the Go¨del number of F (n). Instead of
G(x), we use the notation pA(x˙)q which is common in the literature. We may omit the dot over
variables when no confusion is likely.
Lemma 3.5. For every formula A(x, x1 . . . , xn) with free variables exactly as shown, there exists a
formula B(x1, . . . , xn) such that
HA0 ⊢ B(x1, . . . , xn)↔ A(pB(x˙1, . . . , x˙n)q, x1, . . . , xn)
Moreover, if the formula A is ∆0, then B is also ∆0.
Proof. It is easy to see that the usual proof of the fixed point lemma holds in this setting. ✷
The following lemma states the Σ1-completeness of HA0.
Lemma 3.6. HA0 proves all true Σ1 sentences. Moreover this argument is formalizable and provable
in HA0, i.e. for every Σ1-formula A(x1, . . . , xk) we have HA0 ⊢ A(x1, . . . , xk)→ ✷0A(x˙1, . . . , x˙k).
Proof. It is a well-known fact that any true (in the standard model N) Σ1-sentence is provable in
iΣ1. Moreover this argument is constructive and formalizable in iΣ1. ✷
Lemma 3.7. For every formula A, we have PA ⊢ ∀x ✷+(✷+xA→ A) and HA ⊢ ∀x ✷(✷xA→ A).
Proof. The case of PA is well known. For the case HA, see [Smo73b] or [Vis02, Theorem 8.1]. ✷
3.1.1 Coding of finite sequences
We use some fixed method for encoding of finite sequences and use 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 as the code of the
finite sequence (x1, . . . , xn). We assume here that the encoding is a one-one correspondence between
natural numbers and the associated finite sequences. For details on coding of finite sequences, we
refer the reader to [Smo85], Chapter 0.
Let x = 〈x0, x1, . . . , xn〉 and y = 〈y0, y1, . . . , ym〉. The following notations are used in this paper:
• lth(x) is defined as the length of the sequence with the code x, i.e. here lth(x) := n+ 1,
• x ∗ y := 〈x0, . . . , xn, y0, . . . , ym〉,
• (x)i is defined (if i < lth(x)) as the i-th element in the sequence with the code x, i.e. here
(x)i := xi. If also i ≥ lth(x), we define (x)i := 0,
• xˆ is defined as the final element of the sequence with the code x, i.e. here xˆ := (x)lth(x)−˙1,
• x is an initial segment of y (x ⊆i y) if lth(x) ≤ lth(y) and for all j < lth(x), we have (x)j = (y)j .
3.1.2 Kripke models of HA
A first-order Kripke model for HA is a triple K = (K,<,M) such that:
• The frame of K, i.e. (K,<), is a non-empty partially ordered set,
• M is a function fromK to the first-order classical structures for the language of the arithmetic,
i.e. M(α) is a first-order classical structure, for each α ∈ K,
• For any α ≤ β ∈ K, M(α) is a weak substructure of M(β).
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For any α ∈ K and first-order formula A ∈ Lα (the language of arithmetic augmented with constant
symbols a¯ for each a ∈ |M(α)|), we define K, α  A (or simply α  A, if no confusion is likely)
inductively as follows:
• For atomic A, α  A iff M(α) |= A. Note that in the structure M(α), a¯ is interpreted as a,
• K, α  A ∨B iff K, α  A or K, α  B,
• K, α  A ∧B iff K, α  A and K, α  B,
• K, α  A→ B iff for all β ≥ α, K, β  A implies K, β  B,
• If A = ∀xB, α  A iff for all β ≥ α and each b ∈ |M(β)|, we have β  B[x : b¯].
It is well-known in the literature that HA is complete for first-order Kripke models.
Lemma 3.8. Let K = (K,<,M) be a Kripke model of HA and A be an arbitrary Σ1-formula. Then
for each α ∈ K, we have α  A iff M(α) |= A.
Proof. Use induction on the complexity of A to show that for each α ∈ K, we have α  A iff
M(α) |= A. In the inductive step for → and ∀, use Lemma 3.3. ✷
3.2 q-Realizability and Leivant’s principle
A variant of realizability introduced by Kleene, is q-realizability (see [TvD88]) which is defined
inductively for arithmetical formula A as follows:
• x q A := A for atomic A.
• x q (A1 ∧ A2) := j1(x) q A1 ∧ j2(x) q A2,
• x q (A1 ∨ A2) := (j1(x) = 0→ j2(x) q A1) ∧ (j1(x) 6= 0→ j2(x) q A2),
• x q (A1 → A2) := ∀y (y q A1 → ∃u (Txyu ∧ U(u) q A2)) ∧ (A1 → A2),
• x q ∃yA(y) := j1(x) q A(j2(x)),
• x q ∀yA(y) := ∀y ∃u (Txyu ∧ U(u) q A(y))
In the y above definition j1 and j2 are inverses for a one-to-one onto, pairing function, j, such that
x = j(j1(x), j2(x)). Also Txyu is Kleene’s predicate formalizing “u is a computation for the Turing
Machine with code x with input y”, and U is the result extractor function, i.e. if u is a computation
for a Turing Machine, then U(u) is its output.
Lemma 3.9. For any formula A we have HA0 ⊢ xqA→ A.
Proof. See [TvD88]. ✷
In the following, {x} is partial recursive function of the Turing Machine with the code x. The
notation {x}y↓ means that “the function {x} is defined on input y”, or equivalently “the Turing
machine with the code x halts on the input y”. It is well known that {x}y↓ is a Σ1 sentence. We
use terms which contain some Kleene’s bracket notation. In that case, we use t↓ to mean that all
the brackets in t are defined (terminate).
One immediate consequence of q-realizability, is Church’s Rule for HA:
Lemma 3.10. For every formula A(x, y), if HA ⊢ ∀x∃y A(x, y), then there exists some n ∈ ω such
that HA ⊢ ∀x ({n}(x)↓ ∧ A(x, {n}(x))).
Proof. See [TvD88]. ✷
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It is easy to observe that “HA ⊢ A” implies “there exists some n such that HA ⊢ n q A”([TvD88]).
The point of the following lemma is that we can refine the above statement in the following way.
There exists some recursive function f such that “HAm ⊢ A(k1, . . . , kl)” implies “there exists some
recursive function g such that HAf(m) ⊢ g(k1, . . . , kl) q A(k1, . . . , kl)”. Moreover, we can formalize
this statement in HA.
Lemma 3.11. Suppose that A(x1, . . . , xm) is an arithmetical formula with free variables as shown.
Then, there exists a provably (in HA) total recursive function f such that:
HA ⊢ ✷xA(x˙1, . . . , x˙m)→ ∃z ✷f(x)({z˙}〈x˙1, . . . , x˙m〉↓ ∧ {z˙}〈x˙1, . . . , x˙m〉 q A(x˙1, . . . , x˙m))
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of the soundness part of [TvD88, Theorem 4.10]. First
define f(n) in this way:
f(n) := max({pBq,xq | pBq < n, x is a free variable of B} ∪ {n})
in which, Bq,x := {t(u)}〈x〉↓ ∧ {t(u)}〈x〉 q B, u 6=x and t(u) is a primitive recursive function that
will be defined later in the proof. Let’s fix some sequence of numbers m. With induction on the
complexity of the proof HAn ⊢ A(m), we show that (by A(m), we mean A[x : m]) by
HA ⊢ “HAn ⊢ A(m)” → ∃z “HAf(n) ⊢ {z}〈m〉↓ ∧{z}〈m〉 q A(m)”
We only treat the case where A is an instance of induction schema. All the other cases are trivial.
Assume that pBq < n and
A(m) = (B[x : 0] ∧ ∀x(B → B[x : S(x)]))→ ∀xB
We should find some number {z}〈m〉 = k such that
HAf(n) ⊢ k q [(B(0) ∧ ∀x(B(x)→ B(x + 1))→ ∀xB]
By definition of q-realizability, we have:
k q A(m) =
C︷ ︸︸ ︷
∀u[u q (B(0) ∧ ∀x(B(x)→ B(x + 1))→ ({k}(u)↓ ∧{k}(u) q ∀xB)]∧A(m)
Since f(n) ≥ n, we have HAf(n) ⊢ A(m). Hence it remains only to show that HAf(n) ⊢ C. Define
the primitive recursive function t(u) in the following way. For any given u, t(u) is the code of the
Turing Machine that fulfills the following conditions:{
{t(u)}〈0〉 = j1(u)
{t(u)}(x+ 1) = {{j2(u)}〈x〉}〈{t(u)}〈x〉〉
Finally, let k be the code of the Turing Machine that computes the primitive recursive function t.
Now it is not difficult to observe that, by induction on Bq,x, one could deduce C in HA0, and hence
HAf(n) ⊢ C. This implies HAf(n) ⊢ A(m), as desired. ✷
Lemma 3.12. For every sentence A, there exists some provably (in HA) total recursive function hA
such that HA ⊢ ∀x✷h
A
(x)(✷x˙A→ A).
Proof. By Lemma 3.7 we have HA ⊢ ∀x∃y✷y(✷x˙A→ A). Now we have the desired result by use of
Lemma 3.10. ✷
Lemma 3.13. Suppose that A(x1, . . . , xm) is a Σ1-formula with variables as shown. Then there
exists some nA ∈ N, such that
HA ⊢ A(x1, . . . , xm)→ ({nA}〈x1, . . . , xm〉↓ ∧ {nA}〈x1, . . . , xm〉 q A(x1, . . . , xm))
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Proof. This theorem for r-realizability instead of q-realizability is proved in [TvD88](Proposition
4.4.5). The proof for q-realizability is quite similar and we leave it to the reader. ✷
It is well-known that the disjunction property holds for IPC and HA, however it is also shown
that in case of HA , the proof is not formalizable in HA, i.e. HA 0 ✷(A∨B)→ (✷A∨✷B). But this
is not the end of story! Daniel Leivant in his PhD dissertation [Lei75] showed that HA ⊢ ✷(A∨B)→
✷(A ∨ ✷B). Albert Visser in an unpublished paper showed that we can extend Leivant’s principle
to the following version. For every Σ1-sentence A, HA ⊢ ✷(A → (B ∨ C)) → ✷(A → (✷B ∨ C)).
In the following lemma, we will show that we can find (constructively) from the code x of the proof
of A → (B ∨ C), some f(x) such that ✷(A → (✷f(x)B ∨ C)) holds. Although the statement of
this theorem would not be used later in this paper, we bring it here for better understanding of its
generalization in a more technical lemma, i.e. Lemma 3.17.
Theorem 3.14. For arbitrary sentences A,B,C such that A ∈ Σ1, there exists a provably (in HA)
total recursive function f such that
HA ⊢ ✷x(A→ (B ∨ C))→ ✷f(x)(A→ (✷f(x)B ∨ C))
Proof. First observe that, by Lemma 3.13, there exists some finite number nA ∈ N such that
HA ⊢ A→ ({nA}〈〉↓ ∧ {nA}〈〉 q A). We set t0 := {nA}〈〉. Hence there exists some n0 ∈ N such that
(3.1) HA ⊢ ✷n0(A→ (t0↓ ∧ t0 q A))
We work inside HA. Assume ✷x(A → (B ∨ C)). By Lemma 3.11, there exists some z such
that ✷g
0
(x)({z˙}〈〉↓ ∧ {z˙}〈〉 q (A → (B ∨ C))), in which g0 is the recursive function provided by
Lemma 3.11. We define t1 := {z˙}〈〉 and hence we have ✷g
0
(x)t1↓. If we set g1(y) := g0(y) + n0 , by
use of eq. (3.1), we can deduce ✷g1 (x)(A→ (t0↓∧ {t1}(t0) q (B ∨C))). We set t2 := {t1}(t0). Then,
by definition of q-realizability, we have:
✷g
1
(x)(A→ (t2↓ ∧ (j1(t2) = 0→ j2(t2) q B) ∧ (j1(t2) 6= 0→ j2(t2) q C))).
Let B′ := (j1(t2) = 0) → j2(t2) q B and C
′ := (j1(t2) 6= 0) → j2(t2) q C. Then we have
✷g
1
(x)(A→ B
′) and, hence, by Σ1-completeness (Lemma 3.6), we can deduce ✷0✷g
1
(x)(A → B
′),
that again by use of Lemma 3.6, implies ✷0(A→ ✷g
1
(x)B
′). Thus we have
✷g
1
(x)(A→ (t2↓ ∧ ✷g
1
(x)B
′ ∧C′))
Again by Lemma 3.6 and Lemma 3.9, ✷g1(x)(A→ (t2↓∧(j1(t2) = 0→ ✷g1 (x)B)∧(j1(t2) 6= 0→ C))).
Since atomic formulae are decidable in HA, so for any atomic formulae D, there exists some finite
n2 such that in HAn2 we have decidability of D. Let HAn2 + t2 ↓ decide j1(t2) = 0. If we set
f(x) := g
1
(x) + n2, we can deduce ✷f(x)(A→ (✷f(x)B ∨C)), as desired. ✷
3.3 The extended Leivant’s Principle
In this section, we study properties of the extended Leivant’s principle, Le+. We prove that for any
Σ1- substitution σ, HA ⊢ σHA(Le
+).
Define a translation qσ(A, x) recursively for a modal proposition A and a Σ1-substitution σ, as
follows:
• qσ(A, x) := σHA(A), if A is atomic or boxed,
• qσ(A ∧B, x) := qσ(A, j1(x)) ∧ qσ(B, j2(x)),
• qσ(A ∨B, x) := (j1(x) = 0→ qσ(A, j2(x))) ∧ (j1(x) 6= 0→ qσ(B, j2(x))),
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• ifA = B → C andB ∈ NOI, we define qσ(B → C, x) := σHA(B)→ ({x}(nB )↓ ∧qσ(C, {x}(nB ))),
in which nB is as in Lemma 3.13. If B 6∈ NOI, then define qσ(A, x) := σHA(A).
Lemma 3.15. Let A be a modal proposition and t be a term in first-order language of arithmetic
which possibly contain Kleene’s brackets. Then
• HA0 ⊢ x q σHA(A)→ qσ(A, x),
• HA0 ⊢ (t↓ ∧qσ(A, t))→ σHA(A),
Proof. Proof of both parts are by induction on the complexity of A. ✷
For the next lemma, we need some auxiliary notation σ
l
(A, x). Informally speaking, σ
l
(A, x)
is going to be σ
HA
(Al) with one difference. The new added boxes in Al should be interpreted as
provability in HAx. More precisely, we define it inductively as the following.
• A is atomic or boxed. σ
l
(A, x) := σ
HA
(A),
• A = B ∧ C. then σ
l
(A, x) := σ
l
(B, x) ∧ σ
l
(C, x),
• A = B ∨ C. then σ
l
(A, x) := ✷. xσl(B, x) ∨ ✷
.
xσl(C, x), in which ✷
.
xD is defined as D ∧ ✷xD,
• A = B → C. Like the definition of Al, we define σ
l
(A, x) by cases. If B ∈ NOI, then we define
σ
l
(A, x) := σ
HA
(B)→ σ
l
(C, x), otherwise we define σ
l
(A, x) := σ
HA
(A).
Lemma 3.16. Let A be a modal proposition. Then
1. HA0 ⊢ (x ≤ y ∧ σl(A, x))→ σl(A, y),
2. HA0 ⊢ σl(A, x)→ σHA(A
l),
3. HA0 ⊢ σl(A, x)→ σHA(A).
Proof. Use induction on A. ✷
Lemma 3.17. Let A be a modal proposition, D be any Σ1-sentence and t be a term in first-order
language of arithmetic which possibly contain Kleene’s brackets. Then there exists a provably total
recursive function f such that
HA ⊢ ✷x(D → (t↓ ∧qσ(A, t))→ ✷f(x)(D → σl(A, f(x)))
Proof. We use induction on A. For simplicity of notations, we assume here that t is a normal term.
One can easily build the general case.
Atomic, Boxed or conjunction. Trivial.
Disjunction. Let A = B ∨C. Then by definition of qσ, we have
HA ⊢ ✷x(D → qσ(B∨C, t))→ [✷x((D∧j1(t) = 0)→ qσ(B, j2(t)))∧✷x((D∧j1(t) 6= 0)→ qσ(C, j2(t))]
Hence by the induction hypothesis, there exists functions g and h such that
HA ⊢✷x(D → qσ(B ∨ C, t))→
✷g(x)((D ∧ j1(t) = 0)→ σl(B, g(x))) ∧ ✷h(x)((D ∧ j1(t) 6= 0)→ σl(C, h(x)))
Let f(x) be the maximum of g(x) and h(x). One can use the Σ1-completeness of HA0 (Lemma 3.6)
and Lemma 3.16 to derive
HA ⊢ ✷x(D → qσ(B ∨ C, t))→ ✷f(x)(D → (✷. f(x)σl(B, f(x)) ∨ ✷
.
f(x)σl(C, f(x))))
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Implication. Assume that A = B → C. If B 6∈ NOI, by Lemma 3.15, we are done. So assume that
B ∈ NOI. By definition of qσ, there exists some term t1 such that
HA ⊢ ✷x[D → qσ(B → C, t)]→ ✷x[(D ∧ σHA(B))→ (t1↓ ∧qσ(C, t1))]
Since B ∈ NOI, σ
HA
(B) is a Σ1-formula. Hence by the induction hypothesis, there exists some
function f such that
HA ⊢ ✷x(D → qσ(A, t))→ ✷f(x)((D ∧ σHA(B))→ σl(C, f(x)))
This by definition of σ
l
(B → C, f(x)), implies the desired result. ✷
Lemma 3.18. For any Σ1-substitution σ and modal proposition A, there exists some provably total
recursive function g such that HA ⊢ ✷xσHA(A)→ ✷g(x)σl(A, g(x)).
Proof. Work inside HA. Assume ✷xσHA(A). By Lemma 3.11, there exists some y such that
✷f0(x)(t↓ ∧ t q σHA(A))
in which t := {y}〈〉 and f0 is a provably total recursive function as stated in Lemma 3.11. Hence by
the first item of Lemma 3.15, ✷f0(x)(t↓ ∧qσ(A, t)). Hence by Lemma 3.17, we have the function f
such that ✷f(f0(x))σl(A, f(f0(x)). ✷
Theorem 3.19. For any Σ1-substitution σ, we have HA ⊢ σHA(Le
+).
Proof. Let A be a modal proposition. We must show HA ⊢ ✷σ
HA
(A)→ ✷σ
HA
(Al). Now the desired
result may be deduced by Lemma 3.18 and the second item of Lemma 3.16. ✷
Although there are other ways of proving the above theorem (see [Vis02] or [Iem01]), we need
its major preliminary lemma (i.e. Lemma 3.18) in the proof of the completeness theorem. Specially,
we use Lemma 3.18 in the proof of Lemma 5.12.
3.4 Interpretability
Let T and S be two first-order theories. Informally speaking, we say that T interprets S (T ✄ S)
if there exists a translation from the language of S to the language of T such that T proves the
translation of all of the theorems of S. For a formal definition see [Vis98]. It is well-known that for
recursive theories T and S containing PA, the assertion T ✄S is formalizable in first-order language
of arithmetic. For two arithmetical sentences A and B, we use the notation A ✄ B to mean that
PA+A interprets PA+B. The following theorem due to Orey, first appeared in [Fef60].
Theorem 3.20. For recursive theories T and S containing PA, we have:
PA ⊢ (T ✄ S)↔ ∀x✷TCon(S
x),
in which Sx is the restriction of the theory S to axioms with Go¨del number ≤ x and Con(U) :=
¬✷U⊥.
Proof. See [Fef60]. p.80 or [Ber90]. ✷
Convention. From Theorem 3.20, one can easily observe that PA ⊢ (A✄B)↔ ∀x✷+(A→ ¬✷+x ¬B).
So from now on, A ✄ B means its Π2-equivalent ∀x✷+(A → ¬✷+x ¬B), even when we are working
in weaker theories like HA. We remind the reader that ✷+ stands for provability in PA.
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4 Propositional modal logics
In this section, we collect all the required notions with propositional flavour. This section is mostly
devoted to provide an axiomatic system for the Σ1-provability logic of HA, i.e. iHσ, and stating
some of its essential properties that we need them later in the proof of soundness (Theorem 6.3) or
completeness (Theorem 6.5) of iHσ for arithmetical Σ1-interpretations. The following are some of
important results that will be used in the proof of completeness theorem.
• In Section 4.3, it is shown that the axiomatic system iHσ is capable of simplifying any modal
proposition to an equivalent TNNIL− proposition (Corollary 4.19). This fact is useful for proof of
the completeness theorem (Theorem 6.5).
• In Section 4.4, the TNNIL-conservativity of the theory LC over iHσ (Theorem 4.24) is proved. This
conservativity plays an important role in the proof of completeness theorem. As far as working
with TNNIL-formulas, we get rid of all those complicated axioms of iHσ and just use the more
handful theory LC.
• In Section 4.5, we will prove the finite model property for the theory LC (Theorem 4.26). With
the aid of our main theorem in next section (Theorem 5.1), such finite counter-models are used
to be transformed to a first-order counter-models of HA.
4.1 The NNIL formulae and related topics
The class of No Nested Implications to the Left, NNIL formulae in a propositional language was in-
troduced in [VvBdJRdL95], and more explored in [Vis02]. The crucial result of [Vis02] is providing
an algorithm that as input, receives a non-modal proposition A and returns its best NNIL approxi-
mation A∗ from below, i.e., IPC ⊢ A∗ → A and for all NNIL formula B such that IPC ⊢ B → A, we
have IPC ⊢ B → A∗. Also for all Σ1-substitutions σ, we have HA ⊢ σHA(✷A↔ ✷A
∗) [Vis02].
• In Section 4.1.1, we state Visser’s NNIL-algorithm for computing A∗, and some of its useful
properties.
• In Section 4.1.2, we explain the extension of this algorithm to the modal language (the TNNIL-
algorithm), which computes A+ and is essentially the same as the NNIL-algorithm with this extra
rule: treat inside ✷ as a fresh proposition, i.o.w. in the inductive definition of the algorithm
(✷A)+ := ✷A+. Then we prove some useful properties of the TNNIL-algorithm: Lemma 4.7 and
Corollary 4.8. The best feature of TNNIL-algorithm is that for all Σ1-substitutions σ, we have
HA ⊢ σ
HA
(✷A↔ ✷A+) (first part of Corollary 4.8).
• In Section 4.1.3, we define another algorithm TNNIL− for computing A−, which is essentially the
same as the TNNIL-algorithm, with this minor difference: Only treat those sub-formulae which
are boxed and leave the others. With this minor change, we even have a better feature for A−,
i.e., for all Σ1-substitutions σ, we have HA ⊢ σHA(A↔ A
−) (Lemma 4.10).
Now we define the class NNIL of modal propositions precisely by NNIL := {A | ρA ≤ 1}, in which
the complexity measure ρ, is defined inductively as follows:
• ρ(✷A) = ρ(p) = ρ(⊥) = ρ(⊤) = 0, for an arbitrary atomic variables p and modal proposition A,
• ρ(A ∧B) = ρ(A ∨B) = max(ρA, ρB),
• ρ(A→ B) = max(ρA+ 1, ρB),
In the following, we define another complexity measure o(.) on modal propositions. We need this
measure for termination of the NNIL-algorithm.
Definition 4.1. Let D be a modal proposition. Let
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• I(D) := {E ∈ Sub(D) | E is an implication that is not in the scope of a ✷}.
• i(D) := max{|I(E)| | E ∈ I(D)}, where |X | is the number of elements of X.
• cD := the number of occurrences of logical connectives which are not in the scope of a ✷.
• dD := the maximum number of nested boxes. To be more precise,
– dD := 0 for atomic D,
– dD := max{dD1, dD2}, where D = D1 ◦D2 and ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,→},
– d✷D := dD + 1,
• oD := (dD, iD, cD).
We order the measures oD lexicographically, i.e., (d, i, c) < (d′, i′, c′) iff d < d′ or d = d′, i < i′ or
d = d′, i = i′, c < c′.
For definition of NNIL-algorithm, we use the bracket notation [A]B from [Vis02]. We also use a
variant of this notation, [A]′B:
Definition 4.2. For any two modal propositions A and B, we define [A]B and [A]′B by induction
on the complexity of B:
• [A]B = [A]′B = B, for atomic or boxed B,
• [A](B1 ◦B2) = [A](B1) ◦ [A](B2), [A]′(B1 ◦B2) = [A]′(B1) ◦ [A]′(B2) for ◦ ∈ {∨,∧},
• [A](B1 → B2) = A → (B1 → B2), [A]′(B1 → B2) = A′ → (B1 → B2), in which A′ =
A[B1 → B2 | B2], i.e., replace each outer occurrence of B1 → B2 (by outer occurrence we
mean that it is not in the scope of any ✷) in A by B2,
For a set X of modal propositions, we also define [A]X :=
∨
B∈X A[B] and [A]
′X :=
∨
B∈X [A]
′B.
Remark 4.3. It is easy to observe that [A]B and [A]′B are equivalent in IPC✷.
4.1.1 The NNIL-algorithm
For each modal proposition A, the proposition A∗ is defined by induction on oA as follows [Vis02]:
1. A is atomic or boxed, take A∗ := A.
2. A = B ∧ C, take A∗ := B∗ ∧ C∗.
3. A = B ∨ C, take A∗ := B∗ ∨ C∗.
4. A = B → C, we have several sub-cases. In the following, an occurrence of E in D is called
an outer occurrence, if E is neither in the scope of an implication nor in the scope of a boxed
formula.
(a) C contains an outer occurrence of a conjunction. In this case, there is some formula J(q)
such that
• q is a propositional variable not occurring in A.
• q is outer in J and occurs exactly once.
• C = J [q|(D ∧ E)].
Now set C1 := J [q|D], C2 := J [q|E] and A1 := B → C1, A2 := B → C2 and finally, define
A∗ := A∗1 ∧ A
∗
2.
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(b) B contains an outer occurrence of a disjunction. In this case, there is some formula J(q)
such that
• q is a propositional variable not occurring in A.
• q is outer in J and occurs exactly once.
• B = J [q|(D ∨ E)].
Now set B1 := J [q|D], B2 := J [q|E] and A1 := B1 → C,A2 := B2 → C and finally, define
A∗ := A∗1 ∧ A
∗
2.
(c) B =
∧
X and C =
∨
Y and X,Y are sets of implications or atoms. We have several
sub-cases:
i. X contains atomic variables or boxed formula E. We set D :=
∧
(X \ {E}) and take
A∗ := E∗ → (D → C)∗.
ii. X contains ⊤. Define D :=
∧
(X \ {⊤}) and take A∗ := (D → C)∗.
iii. X contains ⊥. Take A∗ := ⊤.
iv. X contains only implications. For any D = E → F ∈ X , define
B ↓D :=
∧
((X \ {D}) ∪ {F}).
Let Z := {E | E → F ∈ X} ∪ {C} and define:
A∗ :=
∧
{((B ↓D)→ C)∗|D ∈ X} ∧
∨
{([B]′E)∗ | E ∈ Z}
We should show o([B]′E) < oA. For a proof of this fact see [Vis02].
Remark 4.4. In fact in [Vis02], the NNIL-algorithm is only for non-modal propositions. One
may also compute the best NNIL-approximation for modal propositions, in the following way. Let
A be a given modal proposition. Let B1, . . . , Bn be all boxed sub-formulae of A which are not
in the scope of any other boxes. Let A′(p1, . . . , pn) be the unique non-modal proposition such
that {pi}1≤i≤n are fresh atomic variables not occurring in A and A = A′[p1|B1, . . . , pn|Bn]. Let
γ(A) := (A′)∗[p1|B1, . . . , pn|Bn]. Then it is easy to observe that IPC✷ ⊢ γ(A)↔ A∗.
The above defined algorithm is not deterministic, however from the following theorem we know
that A∗ is unique up to IPC✷ equivalence. Notation A ⊲IPC✷,NNIL B (A, NNIL-preserves B) from
[Vis02], means that for each NNIL modal proposition C, if IPC✷ ⊢ C → A, then IPC✷ ⊢ C → B, in
which A,B are modal propositions.
Theorem 4.5. For each modal proposition A,
1. The NNIL algorithm with input A terminates and the output formula A∗, is an NNIL proposition
such that IPC✷ ⊢ A∗ → A.
2. IPC✷ ⊢ A∗ → B iff A ⊲IPC✷,NNIL B.
3. A∗ is the best NNIL approximation of A from below i.e. IPC✷ ⊢ A∗ → A and for each NNIL
proposition B, with IPC✷ ⊢ B → A, we have IPC✷ ⊢ B → A∗.
4. IPC✷ ⊢ A1 → A2 implies IPC✷ ⊢ A∗1 → A
∗
2.
5. IPC✷ ⊢ A↔ B implies IPC✷ ⊢ A∗ ↔ B∗.
6. For each Σ1-substitution σ, HA ⊢ ✷σHA(A)↔ ✷σHA(A
∗).
Proof. 1. Direct consequence of [Vis02, Theorem 7.1]. First assume A′[p1, . . . , pn] be as in Re-
mark 4.4. By [Vis02, Theorem 7.1], we have IPC ⊢ (A′)∗ → A′, and hence by Lemma 2.3,
IPC✷ ⊢ (A′)∗[p1|B1, . . . , pn|Bn]→ A.
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2. Direct consequence of [Vis02, Theorem 7.2]. First suppose that IPC✷ ⊢ A∗ → B. Let A′, B′
be non-modal propositions as defined in Remark 4.4, i.e, A = A′[p1|C1, . . . , pn|Cn], B =
B′[p1|C1, . . . , pn|Cn]. Then by Lemma 2.3, IPC ⊢ (A′)∗ → B′. Now by [Vis02, Theorem 7.2],
we have A′ ⊲IPC,NNIL B
′, and then by Lemma 2.3, A ⊲IPC✷,NNIL B. For the proof of the
other way around, note that all of the previous deductions are reversible.
3. Suppose IPC✷ ⊢ B → A and B is NNIL. Since IPC✷ ⊢ A∗ → A∗, from item 2 above, we get
A ⊲IPC✷,NNIL A
∗. By IPC✷ ⊢ B → A and B ∈ NNIL, we have IPC✷ ⊢ B → A∗.
4. Suppose that IPC✷ ⊢ A1 → A2. By part 1, IPC✷ ⊢ A∗1 → A2 and hence by item 3,
IPC✷ ⊢ A∗1 → A
∗
2.
5. Direct consequence of item 4.
6. First suppose that A is a non-modal proposition. Combining Theorem 10.2 and Corollary
7.2 from [Vis02], implies that IPC ⊢ A∗ → B iff A |∼HAHA,Σ B, in which A |∼
HA
HA,Σ B means
that for each Σ1-substitution σ, we have HA ⊢ ✷σHA(A) → ✷σHA(B). This implies that
HA ⊢ ✷σ
HA
(A)↔ ✷σ
HA
(A∗). Now for a modal proposition A, suppose that A′(p1, . . . , pn) and
B1, . . . , Bn be such that A = A
′[p1|B1, . . . , pn|Bn], in which A′ is a non-modal proposition and
p1, . . . , pn are fresh atomic variables (not occurred in A). Let σ
′ be the substitution defined
by σ′(pi) := σHA(Bi), for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and for any other atomic variable q, σ
′(q) = σ(q).
Clearly, σ′ is again a Σ1-substitution and hence we have HA ⊢ ✷σ′HA(A
′)↔ ✷σ′
HA
((A′)∗). This
implies HA ⊢ ✷σ
HA
(A)↔ ✷σ
HA
(A∗).
✷
4.1.2 The TNNIL-algorithm
Definition 4.6. TNNIL (Thoroughly NNIL) is the smallest class of propositions such that
• TNNIL contains all atomic propositions,
• if A,B ∈ TNNIL, then A ∨B,A ∧B,✷A ∈ TNNIL,
• if all → occurring in A are contained in the scope of a ✷ (or equivalently A ∈ NOI) and
A,B ∈ TNNIL, then A→ B ∈ TNNIL.
Let TNNIL− indicates the set of all the propositions like A(✷B1, . . . ,✷Bn), such that A(p1, . . . , pn)
is an arbitrary non-modal proposition and B1, . . . , Bn ∈ TNNIL.
Here we define A+ to be the TNNIL-formula approximating A. The major difference between
A+ and A∗ is that IPC✷ ⊢ A+ → A may not hold any more. Informally speaking, to find A+, we
first compute A∗ and then replace all outer boxed formula ✷B in A by ✷B+. To be more accurate,
we define A+ by induction on dA. Suppose that for all B with dB < dA, we have defined B+. Now
suppose that A′(p1, . . . , pn) and ✷B1, . . . ,✷Bn are such that A = A
′[p1|✷B1, . . . , pn|✷Bn], where
A′ is a non-modal proposition and p1, . . . , pn are fresh atomic variables (not occurred in A). It is
clear that dBi < dA and then we can define A
+ := (A′)∗[p1|✷B
+
1 , . . . , pn|✷B
+
n ].
Lemma 4.7. For every modal proposition A,
1. If iGL ⊢ A then iGL ⊢ A+.
2. If iK4 ⊢ A then iK4 ⊢ A+.
Proof. We prove the first part by induction on the complexity of proof iGL ⊢ A. Proof of the second
part is similar to the first one.
• A is an axiom.
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– A is Lo¨b’s axiom, i.e., A = ✷(✷B → B) → ✷B. Then A+ = ✷(✷B+ → B+) → ✷B+, that is
valid also in iGL.
– A = ✷B → ✷✷B. Then A+ = ✷B+ → ✷✷B+, that is valid in iGL.
– A = (✷(B → C) ∧ ✷B) → ✷C. Then A+ = (✷(B → C)+ ∧ ✷B+) → ✷C+. On the
other hand, IPC✷ ⊢ (B ∧ (B → C)) → C and hence IPC✷ ⊢ (B ∧ (B → C))∗ → C∗,
by Theorem 4.5 item 4. Now we can infer IPC✷ ⊢ (B+ ∧ (B → C)+) → C+, by defini-
tion of TNNIL-algorithm and Lemma 2.3. Finally, by the necessitation rule in iGL, we have
iGL ⊢ (✷B+ ∧ ✷(B → C)+)→ ✷C+.
• A is a theorem of IPC✷. Then IPC✷ ⊢ A+, by Theorem 4.5 item 5 and Lemma 2.3.
• A = ✷B and A is derived by applying the necessitation rule. Let iGL ⊢ B. By induction
hypothesis, iGL ⊢ B+ and then iGL ⊢ ✷B+.
• A is derived by modus ponens. Let iGL ⊢ B and iGL ⊢ B → A. From these, we have iGL ⊢
B+ ∧ (B → A)+ and then iGL ⊢ (B ∧ (B → A))+. Since IPC✷ ⊢ (B ∧ (B → A)) → A,
then by Theorem 4.5 item 4 we have IPC✷ ⊢ (B ∧ (B → A))∗ → A∗. Then by Lemma 2.3,
IPC✷ ⊢ (B ∧ (B → A))+ → A+ and hence iGL ⊢ A+ as desired.
✷
Corollary 4.8. For any modal proposition A,
1. For all Σ1-substitution σ we have HA ⊢ ✷σHA(A) ↔ ✷σHA(A
+) and hence HA ⊢ σ
HA
(A) iff
HA ⊢ σ
HA
(A+),
2. iGL ⊢ A1 → A2 implies iGL ⊢ A
+
1 → A
+
2 , and iK4 ⊢ A1 → A2 implies iK4 ⊢ A
+
1 → A
+
2 ,
3. iGL ⊢ A1 ↔ A2 implies iGL ⊢ A
+
1 ↔ A
+
2 , and iK4 ⊢ A1 ↔ A2 implies iK4 ⊢ A
+
1 ↔ A
+
2 .
Proof. The first assertion can be deduced simply by induction on dA and using Theorem 4.5 item 6.
To prove the second part, first note that by Theorem 4.5 item 4, if IPC✷ ⊢ A1 → A2, then
IPC✷ ⊢ A∗1 → A
∗
2. By Lemma 2.3, we can replace each outer occurrence of boxed formulae by
arbitrary propositions, in particular, by their TNNIL approximations. We should take care of these
replacements to be such that equal propositions be substituted by equal approximations and unequal
propositions substituted by unequal ones. Then by definition of A+i , we have IPC✷ ⊢ A
+
1 → A
+
2 .
Now suppose that iGL ⊢ A1 → A2 (iK4 ⊢ A1 → A2). Let A = A1 → A2. This implies
IPC✷ ⊢ (A ∧ A1) → A2. Then IPC✷ ⊢ (A ∧ A1)+ → A
+
2 , and hence by TNNIL-algorithm, IPC✷ ⊢
(A+ ∧ A+1 ) → A
+
2 . This implies IPC✷ + A
+ ⊢ A+1 → A
+
2 and by Lemma 4.7, iGL ⊢ A
+
1 → A
+
2
(iK4 ⊢ A+1 → A
+
2 ).
Proof of the third part is a direct consequence of the second part. ✷
4.1.3 The TNNIL−-algorithm
Corollary 4.9. There exists a TNNIL−-algorithm such that for any modal proposition A, it halts
and produces a proposition A− ∈ TNNIL− such that IPC✷ ⊢ A+ → A−.
Proof. Let A := B(✷C1, . . . ,✷Cn), and B(p1, . . . , pn) is non-modal. Clearly such B exists. Then
define A− := B(✷C+1 , . . . ,✷C
+
n ). Now definition of A
+ implies A+ = (A−)∗ and hence Theorem 4.5
item 1 implies that A− has desired property. ✷
Lemma 4.10. For each modal proposition A and Σ1-substitution σ, HA ⊢ σHAA↔ σHAA
−.
Proof. Use definition of (.)− and Corollary 4.8 item 1. ✷
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Remark 4.11. Note that LC ⊢ A ↔ B does not imply LC ⊢ A+ ↔ B+. A counterexample is
A := ¬¬p and B := ¬✷. (¬p). We have A+ = A∗ = p and B+ = (✷¬p → p). Now one can use
Kripke models to show LC 0 (✷¬p→ p)→ p.
Remark 4.12. In the algorithm produced for NNIL, let’s change the step (1) in this way (and use
new symbol (.)† instead of (.)∗)
1. A† := A for atomic A, and (✷B)† := ✷B†,
Then the new algorithm also halts, and for any modal proposition A, we have iK4 ⊢ A† ↔ A+.
4.2 The Box Translation
The following definition of the box-translation, is essentially from [Vis82, Definition 4.1]. The box-
translation extends the well-known Go¨del-McKinsey-Tarski translation. In this subsection, we prove
that iGL is closed under box-translation (Proposition 4.16).
Definition 4.13. For every proposition A in the modal propositional language, we associate a
proposition A✷, called the box-translation of A, in the following way:
• A✷ := A ∧ ✷A, for atomic A,
• (A ◦B)✷ := A✷ ◦B✷, for ◦ ∈ {∨,∧},
• (A→ B)✷ := (A✷ → B✷) ∧ ✷(A✷ → B✷),
• (✷A)✷ := ✷(A✷).
Lemma 4.14. For any modal proposition A, we have iK4 ⊢ A✷ → ✷A✷.
Proof. Easy induction over the complexity of A. ✷
In the following lemma we state some properties of ✷. .
Lemma 4.15. For any modal proposition A, the following propositions are provable in iK4:
1. ✷✷.A↔ ✷A↔ ✷.✷A,
2. ✷.A✷ ↔ A✷.
Proof. The first part is easily deduced in iK4. For the second part use Lemma 4.14. ✷
We say that a modal theory T is closed under box-translation if for every proposition A, T ⊢ A
implies T ⊢ A✷.
Proposition 4.16. The theory iGL is closed under the box-translation.
Proof. The proof can be carried out in three steps:
1. For any proposition A first we show that IPC✷ ⊢ A implies iK4 ⊢ A✷. This can be done by a
routine induction on the length of the proof in IPC. Note that for any axiom A of IPC, we have
iK4 ⊢ A✷. As for the rule of modus ponens, suppose that IPC✷ ⊢ A and IPC✷ ⊢ A → B. By
induction hypothesis, then iK4 ⊢ A✷ and iK4 ⊢ (A✷ → B✷) ∧ ✷(A✷ → B✷) and so iK4 ⊢ B✷.
2. Next observe that
(✷A→ ✷✷A)✷ = ✷A✷ → ✷✷A✷
and also
iK4 ⊢ [(✷(A→ B) ∧ ✷A)→ ✷B]✷ ↔ [(✷(A✷ → B✷) ∧✷A✷)→ ✷B✷]
3. Observe that the box translation of an instance of Lo¨b’s axiom L, is also an instance of L.
✷
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4.3 Axiomatizing the TNNIL-algorithm
In this subsection we present axioms which we need for the TNNIL−-algorithm (.)−. More precisely,
we will find some axiom set X such that X ⊢ A− ↔ A.
To do that, we use some relation ◮ on modal propositions. A variant of this relation for non-
modal case, first appeared in [Vis02]. The relation ◮ is defined to be the smallest relation on modal
propositions satisfying the following conditions:
A1. If iK4 ⊢ A→ B, then A ◮ B,
A2. If A ◮ B and B ◮ C, then A ◮ C,
A3. If C ◮ A and C ◮ B, then C ◮ A ∧B,
A4. If A ◮ B, then ✷A ◮ ✷B,
B1. If A ◮ C and B ◮ C, then A ∨B ◮ C,
B2. Let X be a set of implications, B :=
∧
X and A := B → C. Also assume that Z :=
{E|E → F ∈ X} ∪ {C}. Then A ◮ [B]Z,
B3. If A ◮ B, then for any atomic or boxed C we have C → A ◮ C → B.
Remark 4.17. Let A, B and Z be as in B2. Then the relation ◮ has the following additional
property:
A ◮ [B]′Z
The reason goes as follows. First observe, by induction on E and using A1-A3, that [B]E ◮ [B]′E.
That by use of A1-A3 and B1, implies that [B]Z ◮ [B]′Z. Hence by A2 and B2, we have A ◮ [B]′Z.
The notation A ◮◭ B means A ◮ B and B ◮ A. Let us define the theory
iHσ := LLe
+ + CPa + {✷A→ ✷B|A ◮ B}
Note that by A1, the relation ◮ contains all the pairs (A,B) such that iK4 ⊢ A → B. But
it worth mentioning that the inclusion is strict. The axiom which makes ◮ strictly superset of
{(A,B) : iK4 ⊢ A → B} is B2, i.e. in the absence of B2, the relation ◮ is the same as provable
implications in iK4. However, with B2 the story is different, e.g. one can observe that ¬¬p ◮ p, for
any atomic p, holds while iK4 0 ¬¬p→ p.
Notation. In the rest of the paper, we use A ≡ B as a shorthand for iK4 ⊢ A↔ B.
The following theorem, shows that A1-A4 and B1-B3, axiomatize the TNNIL algorithm:
Theorem 4.18. For any modal proposition A, we have A ◮◭ A+.
Proof. We prove the desired result by induction on o(A). Suppose we have the desired result for
each proposition B with o(B) < o(A). We treat A by the following cases.
1. (A1) A is atomic. Then A+ = A by definition, and the result holds trivially.
2. (A1-A4, B1) A = ✷B,A = B ∧ C,A = B ∨ C. All these cases hold by induction hypothesis. In
boxed case, we use induction hypothesis and A4. In conjunction, we use A1-A3 and in disjunction
we use A1, A2 and B1.
3. A = B → C. There are several sub-cases. Similar to the definition of the NNIL-algorithm, an
occurrence of a sub-formula B of A is said to be an outer occurrence in A, if it is neither in the
scope of a ✷ nor in the scope of →.
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(a) (A1-A3) C contains an outer occurrence of a conjunction. We can treat this case using
induction hypothesis and TNNIL-algorithm.
(b) (A1-A3) B contains an outer occurrence of a disjunction. We can treat this case by induction
hypothesis and TNNIL-algorithm.
(c) B =
∧
X and C =
∨
Y , where X and Y are sets of implications, atoms and boxed formulae.
We have several sub-cases:
i. (A1, A2, B3) X contains atomic variables. Let p be an atomic variable in X . Set
D :=
∧
(X \ {p}). Then A+ ≡ p → (D → C)+. On the other hand, we have by
induction hypothesis and A2 and B3, that p → (D → C)+ ◮◭ p → (D → C). Finally
by A1 and A2, we have A+ ◮◭ A.
ii. (A1, A2, B3) X contains boxed formula. Similar to the previous case.
iii. (A1, A2) X contains ⊤ or ⊥. Trivial.
iv. (A1-A3, B1-B3) X contains only implications. This case needs the axiom B2 and it
seems to be the interesting case. we have:
A+ ≡
∧{
(B ↓D → C)+ | D ∈ X
}
∧
∨
{([B]′E)+ : E ∈ Z}
By the argument in [Vis02], we have o (B ↓D → C) < o(A) and o([B]′E) < o(A) and
hence one can apply induction hypothesis on B ↓D → C and [B]′E. Then by induction
hypothesis, A1-A3, B1 and B3, we have:
A+ ◮◭
∧
{B ↓D → C | D ∈ X} ∧ [B]′Z
First we show that for each E ∈ Z,
(4.1) iK4 ⊢
(∧
{(B ↓D)→ C | D ∈ X} ∧ [B]′E
)
→ A
Since [B]E and [B]′E are IPC✷-equivalent (Remark 4.3), it’s enough to show that
(4.2) iK4 ⊢
(∧
{(B ↓D)→ C | D ∈ X} ∧ [B]E
)
→ A
If E = C, we are done by IPC✷ ⊢ [B]C → (B → C). So let E be the antecedent of
some E → F ∈ X . We reason in iK4. Assume
∧
{(B ↓D → C | D ∈ X}, [B]E and B
as the hypothesis. We want to derive C. From B and [B]E, we derive E. Also from B,
we derive E → F , and so F . Hence we have
∧
(X \ {E → F})∧F , which implies C, as
desired.
Now eq. (4.3) by use of A1 and A2 implies A+ ◮ A.
To show the other way around, i.e. A ◮ A+, we first show
(4.3) A ◮
∧
{B ↓D → C | D ∈ X} ∧ [B]′Z
and then by use of induction hypothesis and A2, we can deduce A ◮ A+, as desired. So
it remains to show that eq. (4.3) holds. We have IPC✷ ⊢ A→
∧
{B ↓D → C | D ∈ X},
and hence by A1, A ◮
∧
{B ↓D → C | D ∈ X}. On the other hand, by Remark 4.17,
we have A ◮ [B]′Z. Now A3 implies eq. (4.3), as desired.
✷
Corollary 4.19. iHσ ⊢ A− ↔ A.
Proof. Let A = B(✷C1,✷C2, . . . ,✷Cn) where B(p1, . . . , pn) is a non-modal proposition. By defini-
tion of A−, we have A− = B(✷C+1 , . . . ,✷C
+
n ). Then Theorem 4.18 implies that iHσ ⊢ ✷(Ci)
+ ↔ ✷Ci.
Hence iHσ ⊢ A− ↔ A, as desired. ✷
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4.4 TNNIL-Conservativity of LC over LLe+
It is clearly the case that LC ⊇ LLe+. One can use Kripke models (from the next section) to show
¬¬✷⊥ ∈ LC \ LLe+. This implies that the inclusion is strict. As we will see later in this section, LC
and LLe+ have the same TNNIL-theorems. To prove this, we need some lemmas.
Lemma 4.20. iK4+ Le+ ⊢ Le.
Proof. Assume some axiom instance of Le, ✷(B ∨ C) → ✷(✷B ∨ C). Let A := B ∨ C. By axiom
schema Le+, we have ✷A → ✷Al, which is ✷(B ∨ C) → ✷(✷.B ∨ ✷.C). This implies (inside iK4)
✷(B ∨C)→ ✷(✷B ∨ C) . ✷
Lemma 4.21. For each modal proposition A,
1. If A ∈ NOI, then iK4+ CPa ⊢ A→ ✷A.
2. iK4 ⊢ Al → A.
3. If A ∈ NOI, then iK4+ CPa ⊢ Al ↔ A.
4. LLe+ ⊢ ✷Al ↔ ✷A.
Proof. Proofs of items 1 to 3 are routine by induction on A. Item 4 is deduced from item 2, i.e. we
have ✷Al → ✷A, by item 2 and ✷Al ← ✷A is exactly Le+. ✷
Lemma 4.22. For any TNNIL formula A, we have
1. LLe+ ⊢ ✷.Al ↔ ✷.A✷,
2. LLe+ ⊢ A✷ → A,
3. If A ∈ NOI, then LLe+ ⊢ A✷ ↔ A,
4. LLe+ ⊢ ✷A↔ ✷A✷.
Proof. We prove all items by induction on the complexity of A, simultaneously. In the middle of
proof, when we are using induction hypothesis of item i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, we mention the number in
parenthesis that number and also when we deduce some item of lemma, we also mention the number
of that part in parentheses as well.
Atomic: For atomic A, we have Al = A and A✷ = ✷.A, hence by properties of ✷. (Lemma 4.15
item 1), iK4 ⊢ ✷.Al ↔ ✷.A✷ (item 1) and LLe+ ⊢ A✷ ↔ A (items 2 and 3), which by necessitation,
that implies LLe+ ⊢ ✷A✷ ↔ ✷A (item 4).
Boxed: Let A = ✷B. Then by definition, Al = A and A✷ = ✷B✷. Hence by induction hypothesis
(item 1), LLe+ ⊢ ✷.Bl ↔ ✷.B✷. Then LLe+ ⊢ ✷.✷Bl ↔ ✷.✷B✷. On the other hand, by Lemma 4.21
item 4, LLe+ ⊢ ✷Bl ↔ ✷B. Hence LLe+ ⊢ ✷.✷B ↔ ✷.✷B✷ (item 1). Also by induction hypothesis
(item 4), LLe+ ⊢ ✷B ↔ ✷B✷. Hence LLe+ ⊢ A ↔ A✷ (items 2 and 3). That, by necessitation,
implies LLe+ ⊢ ✷A↔ ✷A✷ (item 4).
Conjunction: This case is trivial.
Disjunction: Assume A = B ∨ C. If A ∈ NOI, then B,C ∈ NOI and hence induction hypothesis
for B and C (item 3) implies LLe+ ⊢ A✷ ↔ A (item 3). For the other parts, we have, by definition,
Al = ✷.Bl ∨ ✷.Cl. Hence by induction hypothesis (item 1), LLe+ ⊢ Al ↔ (✷.B✷ ∨ ✷.C✷). Hence, by
Lemma 4.15 item 2, we derive LLe+ ⊢ ✷.Al ↔ ✷.A✷ (item 1). To prove the item 2, note that, by
induction hypothesis (item 2), LLe+ ⊢ B✷ → B and LLe+ ⊢ C✷ → C. Hence LLe+ ⊢ (B ∨ C)✷ →
(B ∨ C) (item 2). To prove item 4, we note that, by item 1 for A, we have LLe+ ⊢ ✷.Al ↔ ✷.A✷.
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Hence LLe+ ⊢ ✷✷.Al ↔ ✷✷.A✷, which implies LLe+ ⊢ ✷Al ↔ ✷A✷ (by Lemma 4.15 item 1). Now
Lemma 4.21 item 4 implies LLe+ ⊢ ✷A↔ ✷A✷ (item 4).
Implication: Assume A = B → C. Clearly A 6∈ NOI and B ∈ NOI. We only show induction claim for
item 1. The other items can be shown easily. By induction hypothesis (item 3), LLe+ ⊢ B✷ ↔ B,
and also by Lemma 4.21 item 1, LLe+ ⊢ ✷.B ↔ B. Note that ✷.Al = ✷. (B → Cl) and hence
LLe+ ⊢ ✷.Al ↔ ✷. (✷.B → Cl). By Lemma 4.21 item 3, LLe+ ⊢ Bl ↔ B, hence LLe+ ⊢ ✷.Al ↔
✷. (✷.Bl → Cl). Now properties of ✷. implies that LLe+ ⊢ ✷.Al ↔ ✷. (✷.Bl → ✷.Cl), and induction
hypothesis (item 1), implies LLe+ ⊢ ✷.Al ↔ ✷. (✷.B✷ → ✷.C✷). This implies, again by properties of
✷. , the desired result, LLe+ ⊢ ✷.Al ↔ ✷.A✷ (item 1). ✷
Lemma 4.23. If LC ⊢ A, then iGL ⊢ A✷.
Proof. From LC ⊢ A we have iGL ⊢
∧
i ✷
. (Bi → ✷Bi) → A. Hence by Proposition 4.16, we have
iGL ⊢ [
∧
i ✷
. (Bi → ✷Bi) → A]✷. This implies iGL ⊢
∧
i ✷
. (B✷i → ✷B
✷
i ) → A
✷. Now Lemma 4.15
item 2 implies iGL ⊢ A✷, as desired. ✷
Theorem 4.24. LC is TNNIL-conservative over LLe+.
Proof. Let LC ⊢ A. From Lemma 4.23 we have iGL ⊢ A✷ and hence LLe+ ⊢ A✷. Now Lemma 4.22
item 2 implies that LLe+ ⊢ A. ✷
4.5 Kripke semantics for LC
Let us first review results and notations from [Iem01] which will be used here. Assume two binary
relations R and S on a set. Define α(R ◦ S)γ iff there exists some β such that αRβ and βSγ.
A Kripke model K, for intuitionistic modal logic, is a quadruple (K,<,R, V ), such that K is a
set (we call its elements as nodes), (K,<) is a partial ordering, R is a binary relation on K such
that (≤ ◦R) ⊆ R, and V is a binary relation between nodes and atomic variables such that αV p
and α ≤ β implies βV p. Then we can extend V to the modal language with R corresponding to ✷
and ≤ for intuitionistic →. More precisely, we define  inductively as an extension of V as follows:
• K, α  p iff αV p, for atomic variable p,
• K, α  A ∨B iff K, α  A or K, α  B,
• K, α  A ∧B iff K, α  A and K, α  B,
• K, α 1 ⊥ and K, α  ⊤,
• K, α  A→ B iff for all β ≥ α, K, β  A implies K, β  B,
• K, α  ✷A iff for all β with αRβ, we have K, β  A.
If also we assume that R is empty and restrict our attention to non-modal language, we have the
usual Kripke models for intuitionistic (non-modal) logic. In the rest of paper, we may simply write
α  A instead of K, α  A, if no confusion is likely. By an induction on the complexity of A, one
can observe that α  A implies β  A for all A and α ≤ β. We define the following notions.
• If α ≤ β, β is called to be above α and α is beneath β. If α R β, β is called to be a successor
of α. We define R(α) to be the set of all successors of α.
• A Kripke model is finite if its set of nodes is finite. A Kripke model is tree-frame if its set of
nodes with ordering ≤ is a tree.
• AKripke modelK = (K,<,R, V ) is reverse well-founded iffK is well-founded with the ordering
R−1.
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• K is called neat iff αR γ and α ≤ β ≤ γ implies αRβ or βR γ.
• K is called brilliant iff (R ◦ ≤) ⊆ R. ([Iem01])
• K is called perfect iff it is brilliant, reverse well-founded and R ⊆<.
• Suppose X is a set of propositions that is closed under sub-formulae (we call such X to be
adequate). An X-saturated set of propositions Γ with respect to some theory T is a subset of
X that
– For each A ∨B ∈ X , T + Γ ⊢ A ∨B implies A ∈ Γ or B ∈ Γ.
– For each A ∈ X , T + Γ ⊢ A implies A ∈ Γ.
Lemma 4.25. Let T 0 A and let X be an adequate set. Then there is an X-saturated set Γ such
that T ∩X ⊆ Γ 0 A.
Proof. See [Iem01]. ✷
Theorem 4.26. LC is sound and complete for finite neat perfect Kripke models with tree frames.
Proof. Soundness part can easily be proved by induction on the complexity of formulae. For the
completeness, we first find some finite perfect Kripke counter-model for each A with LC 0 A, and
then convert it to a perfect Kripke model with finite tree frame.
Assume LC 0 A. Let Sub(A) be the set of sub-formulae of A. Then define
X := {B,✷B | B ∈ Sub(A)}
It is obvious that X is a finite adequate set. We define K = (K,<,R, V ) as follows. Take K as the
set of all X-saturated sets with respect to LC, and ≤ is the subset relation over K. Define αRβ iff
for all ✷B ∈ X , ✷B ∈ α implies B ∈ β, and also there exists some ✷C ∈ β \ α. Finally define αV p
iff p ∈ α, for atomic p.
It only remains to show that K is a finite perfect Kripke model that refutes A. To do this, we first
show by induction on B ∈ X that B ∈ α iff α  B, for each α ∈ K. The only non-trivial case
is B = ✷C. Let ✷C 6∈ α. We must show α 1 ✷C. The other direction is easier to prove and we
leave it to reader. Let β0 := {D ∈ X | α ⊢ ✷D}. If β0,✷C ⊢ C, then, by definition of β0, we have
α ⊢ ✷β0 and hence by Lo¨b’s axiom, α ⊢ ✷C, contradicting ✷C 6∈ α. Hence β0,✷C 0 C and so there
exists some X-saturated set β such that β 0 C, β ⊇ β0 ∪ {✷C}. Hence β ∈ K and αRβ. Then by
induction hypothesis, β 1 C and hence α 1 ✷C.
Since LC 0 A, by Lemma 4.25, there exists some X-saturated set α ∈ K such that α 0 A, and
hence by the above argument we have α 1 A.
K trivially satisfies all the properties of perfect Kripke model. As a sample, we show that why R ⊆<
holds. Assume αRβ and let B ∈ α. If B is boxed formula, like C, then by definition, C ∈ β and
hence β ⊢ B and we are done. So assume B is not a boxed formula. Then by definition of X , we
have ✷B ∈ X and by the completeness axiom in LC, we have α ⊢ ✷B and hence by definition of R,
it is the case that B ∈ β. This shows α ⊆ β and hence α ≤ β. But α is not equal to β, because
αRβ implies existence of some ✷C ∈ β \ α. Hence α < β, as desired.
Now we explain how to convert K to a Kripke model T := (T,<t,Rt, Vt) 1 A with a neat tree
frame. Let T be the set of all finite (excluding empty sequence) sequences 〈α1, . . . , αn〉 such that
α1 < . . . < αn. Let ≤t be the initial segment relation. Then define 〈α1, . . . , αn〉 Rt 〈α1, . . . , αn+k〉
iff αn+iRαn+i+1 for some 0 ≤ i < k. Finally, define 〈α1, . . . , αn〉 Vt p, for atomic p, iff αn V p.
Now one can prove by induction on B, that for any α = 〈α1, . . . , αn〉 ∈ T , T , α  B iff K, αn  B.
Hence T 1 A. ✷
Since LC has finite model property, as it is expected, we can easily deduce the decidability of LC:
Corollary 4.27. LC is decidable.
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Proof. Let A be given. Assume that n is the number of elements of X defined in the above proof.
It shows us that we should only check if for all Kripke models K with 2n nodes (only over atomic
variables that appear in A), we have K  A. If that was the case, we say “yes” to LC ⊢ A?, otherwise
the answer is “no” to LC ⊢ A?. ✷
Relation to intuitionistic non-modal Kripke models
The usual intuitionistic non-modal Kripke models are the same Kripke models as is defined above,
without the additional relation R. Extending it to all non-modal propositions is the same as the one
for modal language. It is well-known that IPC is sound and complete for non-modal Kripke models.
We have the following conservativity result.
Theorem 4.28. LC+✷⊥ is conservative over IPC in non-modal language, i.e. for any non-modal
proposition A, if LC+✷⊥ ⊢ A, then IPC ⊢ A.
Proof. We reason contrapositively. Assume that IPC 0 A. Then by completeness, there exists some
non-modal Kripke model K = (K,≤, V ) 1 A. Let R := ∅ and K′ := (K,≤,R, V ). It is easy
to observe that K′ is a Kripke model and for all non-modal proposition B and u ∈ K, we have
K, u  B iff K′, u  B. Hence we have K′ 1 A. Now soundness theorem (Theorem 4.26) implies
LC+✷⊥ 0 A. ✷
5 Transforming Kripke models
Smory´nski ([Smo73a]) showed that one could simulate the behaviour of a propositional non-modal
Kripke model by a first-order Kripke model of HA. Also Solovay ([Sol76]) showed that one could
simulate the behaviour of a Kripke model of classical modal logic inside PA. However, the combi-
nation of these two ideas could be assumed as major obstacle towards the characterization of the
provability logic of HA. In this section, we will show that one could simulate the behaviour of perfect
Kripke models by first-order Kripke models of HA. This would lead us to the characterization of the
Σ1-provability logic of HA. More precisely, we will prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1. Let K0 = (K0,R0, <0, V0) be a finite neat perfect Kripke model with tree frame and
Γ ⊆ TNNIL− be a finite set. Then there exists some arithmetical Σ1-substitution σ and a Kripke
model K1 = (K0, <0,M) such that for all A ∈ Γ and α ∈ K0 we have K0, α  A iff K1, α  σHA(A).
Before we continue with the rather long proof of Theorem 5.1, that will take up all of this section,
let us explain the outline of the proof.
First we define a recursive function F (the Solovay function) with the domain of natural numbers.
F (0) is defined to be some fresh node α0. The function F , always climbs over the frame (K0,R0, <0),
but it is reluctant to do so. It only goes to some node β at some stage n+ 1 (i.e. F (n+ 1) = β), if
n+ 1 is a witness (in some sense which would be clarified in this section) for this statement
“F is not going to stay in β forever or ¬σ
HA
(✷ϕ
β
)”.
In this definition, ϕ
β
is the conjunction of all sentences B such that ✷B ∈ Sub(Γ) and β  ✷B.
Here, Sub(Γ) is the set of sub-formulae of some formula in Γ. The most interesting (and difficult part
to prove as well) property of the function F is that this function actually (in the standard model of
arithmetic N) does not climb over tree at all, i.e. the function F is constant, N |= ∀xF (x) = α0. In
contrast with the classical case, proving this fact for the intuitionistic case is rather complicated.
Let L < α denote “the function F would go above α or remain equal to α”. Then we define the
substitution σ(p) :=
∨
αp L < α. Then we define the I-frame I = (K0, <0, T ), where Tα is defined
to be PA plus the following statement: “The limit of the function F is α”. Finally, with the aid
of Theorem 5.29 we find the desired Kripke model K1, by assigning an appropriate classical model
of Tα to the node α. We will show that Tα ⊢ σHA(✷ϕα) (Corollary 5.23) and also Tα ⊢ σHA(¬✷B)
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for any ✷B ∈ Sub(Γ) and α 1 ✷B (Theorem 5.15). In this way, we can simulate the role of modal
operator ✷ in the first-order Kripke model K1.
Notation. In the rest of this section, we fix the Kripke model K0 = (K0,R0, <0, V0) and the set
S := {B ∈ Sub(Γ) | B ∈ TNNIL}. We also assume that α0 6∈ K0 and define
R := R0 ∪ {(α0, α) | α ∈ K0} < := <0 ∪ {(α0, α) | α ∈ K0} K := K0 ∪ {α0}
In other words, we add α0 in beneath of all nodes of K0. Finally we define K := (K,R, <, V0).
5.1 Definition of the Solovay function
Solovay used some special recursive function (here we call it the Solovay function) to prove the
completeness of GL (The Go¨del-Lo¨b logic) for arithmetical interpretations in PA (See [Sol76]). The
Solovay function in [Sol76], is a function G : N −→ X , in which X is a finite partially ordered set
ordered by 4. The recursive definition of G is such that G climbs over X , i.e. G(x) 4 G(x+1) and
moreover, it goes to some new node iff there exists a witness that G would not remain there. More
precisely, G(x + 1) 6= G(x) iff x + 1 is the code of a proof (in PA) for the fact that the limit of the
function G is not G(x + 1). Although it is true (in the standard model) that G will not climb over
X (i.e. G is a constant function), PA can’t prove this fact. In this subsection, we define a similar
recursive function (we call it F ) for the proof of our main theorem (Theorem 5.1), and state and
prove some of its properties.
For technical reasons, we first define the set of all codes of sequences z = 〈F (0), . . . , F (x)〉 by an
arithmetical formula θ(z), and then define φθ(x, y) := ∃z(lth(z) = x+1∧ θ(z)∧ zˆ = y) as the graph
of a function Fθ and finally, let F := Fθ. It is clear that we can also define θF (z) from the function
F in the following way.
θF (z) := ∃x(z = 〈F (0), . . . , F (x)〉) or equivalently θF (z) := ∀x< lth(z)(F (x) = (z)x)
To be able to speak about K inside HA, we need some conventions. Suppose that K =
{α0, α1, . . . , αk}. Hence for each α ∈ K, there exists a unique index 0 ≤ i ≤ k such that α = αi. We
define α to be i¯ (n¯ is n-th numeral in the language of arithmetic, i.e. i¯ := Si(0)). We may simply
use α instead of α, if no confusion is likely. The following notations for arbitrary terms t and s in
the language of arithmetic will be used later.
• K(t) :=
∨
α∈K(t = α),
• t ≺ s :=
∨
αβ(t = α ∧ s = β), t 4 s :=
∨
α≤β(t = α ∧ s = β),
• t R s :=
∨
αRβ(t = α ∧ s = β),
• ϕ
α
:=
∧
B∈Sub(Γ),B∈TNNIL,α✷B B.
In the following definition, Lθ = y as the arithmetical formula equivalent to “The limit of the
function Fθ is equal to y”. Similarly, define α ≺ Lθ and so on.
Definition 5.2. Let θ(z) be a Σ1-formula in the language of arithmetic. Then
• Lθ = y is a shorthand for ∃u∀z(θ(u ∗ z) → zˆ = y) in which zˆ is the final element of the
sequence with the code z,
• For each α ∈ K, α 4 Lθ, α ≺ Lθ and αRLθ are shorthands for
∨
α≤β ∃x(θ(x) ∧ xˆ = β),∨
αβ ∃x(θ(x) ∧ xˆ = β) and
∨
αRβ ∃x(θ(x) ∧ xˆ = β), respectively,
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• The arithmetical substitution σ is defined on propositional variable p by
σ(p) :=
∨
βp
β 4 Lθ.
and finally, we extend σ to all propositions by interpreting ✷ as provability in HA , i.e.,
σθ := σHA , in which σHA is defined from σ as in Definition 2.1,
• Let g be a recursive function with θg(z) as the formula ∃x(z = 〈g(0), . . . , g(x)〉). We define
Lg = y, Lg ≻ α, Lg  α, αRLg and σg to be Lθg = y, Lθg ≻ α, Lθg  α, αRLθg and σθg ,
respectively.
Following Berarducci ([Ber90]), we define a primitive recursive function as follows:
r
θ
(α¯, x) = min ({k | ∃u ≤ xProofPAk (u, p¬(L = α ∧ ✷σθ (ϕα))q)} ∪ {x+ 1})
Note that r
θ
(x, y) depends also on a Σ1-formula which is appeared in the subscript of σ. We
also should note that L = α is defined in reference to θ as well. We may omit subscripts of the
interpretation σ
θ
and the function r
θ
when no confusion is likely.
A variant of this function was first appeared in [Ber90], to define Solovay functions for charac-
terizing interpretability logic of PA. It is easy to observe that r(α, x) is always equal or less than
x+ 1, and r(α, x) ≤ x iff
∃y ≤ xProofPA (y, p¬(L = α ∧ ✷σF (ϕα))q)
Now we are in a position to define the Solovay-like function forK. Informally speaking, F : N→ K
is defined in such a way that fulfils the following conditions. F (0) := α0, and
(5.1) F (x+ 1) :=


β if (x+ 1)0 = 〈1, β〉, F (x)Rβ and rF (β, x + 1) ≤ x+ 1,
γ if (x+ 1)0 = 〈2, γ〉,¬F (x)Rγ and F (x) ≤ γ and
r
F
(γ, x+ 1) < r
F
(F (x), x + 1) and F (r
F
(γ, x+ 1))R γ,
F (x) otherwise.
As it is clear from the definition, F is used in its own definition, i.e. we are in a loop. This will be
overcome by the Diagonalization lemma. To be able to define F , we first define θ(z) and then define
F (x) = y (the graph of the function F ) as
∃z(lth(z) = x+ 1 ∧ θ(z) ∧ (z)x = y)
By Diagonalization lemma (Lemma 3.5), we find a ∆0 formula θ(y) such that
(5.2) HA0 ⊢ θ(y)↔ (lth(y) ≥ 1 ∧ (y)0 = α0 ∧ ∀x < lth(y)(x 6= 0→ χ(x, y)))
in which χ(x, y) is defined as disjunction of the following three formulae:
χ1 :=
∨
β∈K
[(x)0 = 〈1, β¯〉 ∧ (y)x = β¯ ∧ (y)x−˙1 R¯ β¯ ∧ r(β¯, x) ≤ x]
χ2 :=
∨
β∈K
[(x)0 = 〈2, β¯〉 ∧ (y)x = β¯ ∧ ¬(y)x−˙1 R¯ β¯ ∧ (y)x−˙1 4 β¯ ∧ r((y)x, x) < r((y)x−˙1, x))
∧ (y)r((y)x,x) R¯ (y)x)]
χ3 := [(y)x = (y)x−˙1] ∧
∧
β∈K
¬[(x)0 = 〈1, β¯〉 ∧ (y)x−˙1 R¯ β¯ ∧ r(β¯, x) ≤ x]∧
∧
β∈K
¬[(y)x−˙1 4 β¯ ∧ ¬(y)x−˙1 R¯ β¯ ∧ (x)0 = 〈2, β¯〉 ∧ r(β¯, x) < r((y)x−˙1, x) ∧ (y)r(β¯,x) R¯ β¯)]
In the above formulae, r(x, y) is r
θ
(x, y). Now we show that a provably total recursive function F
can be defined from θ(y).
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Lemma 5.3. The formula θ is ∆0 and
1. HA0 ⊢ (lth(y1) 6= 0 ∧ θ(y1 ∗ y2))→ θ(y1),
2. HA0 ⊢ (θ(y1) ∧ θ(y2) ∧ lth(y1) = lth(y2))→ y1 = y2,
3. HA0 ⊢ ∀x∃y(lth(y) = x+ 1 ∧ θ(y)).
Proof. It is not difficult to observe that the first item holds by definition of θ in eq. (5.2). To prove
the other items, it is enough to show HA0 ⊢ ∀x∃!y(lth(y) = x + 1 ∧ θ(y)), in which !∃, as usual, is
the uniqueness existential quantifier. This can be simply done by induction on x. ✷
Now, let us define φ(x, y) := ∃z(θ(z)∧ lth(z) = x+1∧ zˆ = y). Note that φ(x, y) is actually a ∆0
formula. The reason is the following. we can bound existential quantifier by the primitive recursive
function h(z) with the following primitive recursive definition:
• h(0) := 〈k〉, in which k is the number of nodes of Kripke model,
• h(z + 1) := h(z) ∗ 〈k〉.
Hence HA0 ⊢ φ(x, y)↔ ∃z ≤ h(z)[lth(z) = x+ 1 ∧ (z)x+1 = y ∧ φ(z)].
Notation 5.4. The above lemma (Lemma 5.3) says that φ(x, y) is the graph of a ∆0- function F . In
the rest of the paper, we use F as a function symbol with the graph φ(x, y). We use σ and L instead
of σθ and Lθ, respectively. For simplicity of notations, when we work in the first-order language of
arithmetic, instead of σ
HA
(B), we may use the notation B. For instance assume that p is an atomic
variable in the propositional language. When we write down the formula HA ⊢ ✷(✷p→ p)→ ✷p, we
actually mean HA ⊢ σ
HA
(✷(✷p→ p)→ ✷p). This abuse of notations, wipes out many unimportant
symbols from the rest of Section 5.
One can observe that the function F fulfils the recursive conditions of eq. (5.1).
5.2 Elementary properties of the Solovay function
In this part, we will see some elementary properties of the function F .
Lemma 5.5. The function F has the following properties:
1. HA0 ⊢ ∀x, y(F (x) 4 F (x+ y)),
2. For any α ∈ K, PA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = α→
∨
α≤β L = β,
3. For any α ∈ K, PA ⊢ α ≺ L↔
∨
α<β L = β and PA ⊢ α R¯L↔
∨
αRβ L = β.
Proof. 1. By recursive definition of F , HA0 ⊢ F (x) 4 F (x + 1). Let A(y) := F¯ (x) 4 F¯ (x+ y) and
use induction on y in A(y).
2. We prove this fact by induction (in meta-language) on the tree (K,) with reverse order. Suppose
that for all β 	 α, we have PA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = β →
∨
β≤γ L = γ. Then
PA ⊢ F (x) = α→ (∀y ≥ xF (y) = α ∨ ∃y ≥ xF (y) 6= α)
By part 1 and definition of L = α, we get PA ⊢ F (x) = α → (L = α ∨ ∃y ≥ x(α ≺ F (y))). Now
induction hypothesis implies PA ⊢ F (x) = α→
∨
β≥α L = β.
3. Proof of this part is an immediate consequence of part 2 and perfectness of K.
✷
Lemma 5.6. For any α, β ∈ K with αRβ, HA0 ⊢ L = α→ ¬✷+¬(L = β ∧ ✷ϕβ ).
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Proof. We argue inside HA0. Assume L = α and ProofPA (x, p¬(L = β ∧ ✷ϕβ )q). Let y > x such
that (y + 1)0 = 〈2, β〉. Then because L = α, we have F (y) = α. On the other hand, by recursive
definition of F , F (y + 1) := β, a contradiction. ✷
Lemma 5.7. For any δ, α, β ∈ K with δRα ≤ β, HA0 + L = δ ⊢ (L = α ∧✷ϕα)✄ (L = β ∧✷ϕβ).
Proof. If αRβ, by Lemma 5.6, HA0 ⊢ L = α→ ¬✷+¬(L = β ∧ ✷ϕβ ). So
N |= ✷+(L = α→ ¬✷+¬(L = β ∧ ✷ϕ
β
))
and hence by Lemma 3.6 (Σ1-completeness of HA0), we can deduce HA0 ⊢ L = α✄ (L = β ∧ ✷ϕβ ).
So assume α R β and α 6= β. By definition of A✄B, we must show
HA0 + L = δ ⊢ ∀x✷
+[(L = α ∧ ✷ϕα)→ ¬✷
+
x ¬(L = β ∧ ✷ϕβ)].
We work inside HA0. Assume L = δ and fix some large enough x such that F (x) = δ. Then
for each u ≤ x, we have F (u)Rβ. Now work in the scope of ✷+. By Σ-completeness of PA, we
have ∀u ≤ xF (u)Rβ. Assume L = α, ✷ϕ
α
and ✷+x ¬(L = β ∧ ✷ϕβ ). We should deduce ⊥. By
✷
+
x ¬(L = β ∧✷ϕβ ), for sufficiently large y (larger than 〈2, β〉 ∗ z, in which z is a proof code in PAx
for ¬(L = β ∧✷ϕ
β
)), we have r(β, y) ≤ x. If r(α, y) ≤ r(β, y), then ✷+x ¬(L = α ∧✷ϕα), and hence
by Lemma 3.7, we have ¬(L = α ∧ ✷ϕ
α
), a contradiction. If r(α, y) > r(β, y), since r(β, y) ≤ x,
then F (r(β, y))Rβ. So by recursive definition of F , there exists some z ≥ y such that F (z) = β,
contradicting L = α. ✷
5.3 Deciding the boxed formulas
In this subsection, we will show that HA + L = α + ✷ϕ
α
can decide boxed propositions in Sub(Γ).
More precisely, for all ✷B ∈ Sub(Γ) and α ∈ K,{
HA+ L = α+✷ϕ
α
⊢ ✷B if α  ✷B
HA+ L = α+✷ϕ
α
⊢ ¬✷B if α 1 ✷B
Note that by definition of ϕ
α
, if α  ✷B, then B is a conjunct of ϕ
α
. Hence in case α  ✷B,
we obviously have HA + ✷ϕ
α
⊢ ✷B. Moreover we will show in Section 5.4 (Corollary 5.23) that
HA ⊢ L = α→ ✷ϕ
α
for α ∈ K0, and then the following improvement of the above equation holds:{
HA+ L = α ⊢ ✷B if α  ✷B
HA+ L = α ⊢ ¬✷B if α 1 ✷B
Lemma 5.8. Let B ∈ Sub(Γ) be such that all occurrences of → in B are in the scope of some ✷
(B ∈ NOI), α ∈ K and α  B. Then HA0 ⊢ (L = α ∧ ✷ϕα) → B. Moreover, this argument is
formalizable and provable in HA0, i.e. HA0 ⊢ ✷0((L = α ∧ ✷ϕα)→ B).
Proof. One can prove HA0 ⊢ (L = α ∧ ✷ϕα) → B, by induction on the complexity of B. Then by
Lemma 3.6, we derive its formalized form in HA0. ✷
Notation 5.9. We say that α 1max A if α 1 A and for all β 	 α we have β  A.
We have the following observations:
• α 1max B → C iff “α  B and α 1max C”,
• α 1max B ∨ C implies “α 1 B and α 1 C”,
• α 1max B ∧ C iff “α 1max B or α 1max C”.
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Let A be a TNNIL-formula such that α 1max A. In Lemma 5.12 and Lemma 5.13, we need to put
✷x before all occurrences of subformulas B in the right of →, when it is not the case that α 1max B.
This is the content of the following definition.
Definition 5.10. Let A be a modal proposition, α ∈ K and x be a variable. We define the first-
order sentence d(A,α, x), by induction on A. If this is not the case that α 1max A, then we define
d(A,α, x) := ✷xσHA(A), and if α 1max A, we define the formula d(A,α, x) by cases:
• A is atomic or boxed. d(A,α, x) := σ
HA
(A),
• A = B → C. Define d(A,α, x) by cases. If B 6∈ NOI, then let d(A,α, x) := σ
HA
(A), otherwise
let d(A,α, x) := σ
HA
(B)→ d(C,α, x),
• A = B ∧ C. If α 1max B then d(A,α, x) := d(B,α, x), else d(A,α, x) := d(C,α, x),
• A = B ∨ C. d(A,α, x) := d(B,α, x) ∨ d(C,α, x).
In the following lemma, we use definition of σ
l
(A, x) from Section 3.3:
Lemma 5.11. Let A be a modal proposition, α ∈ K such that α 1max A. Then
HA0 ⊢ σl(A, x)→ d(A,α, x)
Proof. Use induction on A. ✷
Lemma 5.12. Let A be a modal proposition. Then there exists some provably (in HA) total recursive
function g
A
such that for any α ∈ K with α 1max A we have
HA ⊢ ✷xA→ ✷g
A
(x)d(A,α, gA(x))
Proof. Use Lemma 3.18 and Lemma 5.11. ✷
Let HA ⊢ A, for arbitrary A in the language of arithmetic. Then by the compactness theorem, one
could deduce that HAn ⊢ A for some n ∈ ω. In the following definition of the n1 and n2, we make
use of this fact. Define m ∈ ω as the maximum of the following ni’s:
• n1. By Lemma 5.12 and the compactness theorem, we can find some n1 such that for each
B ∈ Sub(Γ), g
B
is provably total in HAn1 .
• n2. For each α ∈ K and B ∈ Sub(Γ) such that α 1max B, by Lemma 5.12 and the compactness
theorem, there exists some n such that HAn proves the desired sentence of the Lemma. Let
n2 be the maximum of such n.
• n3. By Lemma 3.12, for each α ∈ K, there exists some provably (in HA) total function hα,
such that hα(x) ≥ x and HA ⊢ ✷hα(x)(✷x¬(L = α ∧ ✷ϕα)→ ¬(L = α ∧ ✷ϕα)). Hence by the
compactness theorem, there exists some nα ∈ ω such that hα is provably total in HAnα and
HAnα ⊢ ✷hα(x)(✷x¬(L = α ∧✷ϕα)→ ¬(L = α ∧ ✷ϕα))
Let n3 := max{nα|α ∈ K}.
Then define gˆ
B
(x) as the maximum of g
B
(x), m and x. Assume some B ∈ Sub(Γ). We define the
provably (in HAm) total recursive function fB , by induction on the complexity of B:
f
B
(x) :=
{
max(X) if X = {hα(fC (gˆB (x))) | C ∈ Sub(B), C 6= B,α ∈ K} 6= ∅
gˆ
B
(x) else
where hα is as we stated in definition of n3. From the above definition, one can observe that for
each atomic C ∈ Sub(Γ), the set X is empty. Hence we have f
C
(x) = x. Since each non-atomic
formula B has some atomic sub-formula C, one can deduce that f
B
(x) ≥ gˆ
B
(x) ≥ x,m. Moreover,
all of the above functions are provably total in HAm.
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Lemma 5.13. Let B,E ∈ Sub(Γ) ∩ TNNIL and β ∈ K, such that β 1max B, β 1max E and
B ∈ Sub(E). Then
(5.3) HAm ⊢ [F (fE (x))Rβ ∧✷xE]→ ✷fE (x)
(
(L = β ∧ ✷ϕ
β
)→ ¬d(B, β, gˆ
E
(x))
)
Proof. We prove eq. (5.3) by induction on the complexity of B. As induction hypothesis, assume
that for any sub-formula C of B (C 6= B) and any E′ ∈ Sub(Γ) ∩ TNNIL and γ ∈ K, such that
C ∈ Sub(E′) and γ 1max C,E′, we have
HAm ⊢
(
F (f
E′
(x))R γ ∧ ✷xE
′
)
→ ✷f
E′
(x)
(
(L = γ ∧ ✷ϕ
γ
)→ ¬d(C, γ, gˆ
E′
(x))
)
We consider different cases.
• B is atomic. Then d(B, β, gˆ
B
(x)) = σ(B) and the desired result holds by definition of the substi-
tution σ and β 1 B and also by Lemma 5.5 item 1,
• B = ✷C. Then d(B, β, gˆ
B
(x)) = σ
HA
(B) = ✷σ
HA
(C). Since β 1max ✷C, there exists some γ such
that βR γ 1max C. Then, by induction hypothesis,
HAm ⊢ (F (fC (x)) R γ ∧ ✷xC)→ ✷fC (x)
(
(L = γ ∧ ✷ϕ
γ
)→ ¬d(C, γ, gˆ
C
(x))
)
By Lemma 5.12, we have HAm ⊢ ✷xC → ✷f
C
(x)d(C, γ, gˆC (x)). Hence
HAm ⊢ (L = β ∧ ✷C)→ ✷¬
(
L = γ ∧ ✷ϕ
γ
)
By Lemma 5.6, we have HAm ⊢ ¬ (L = β ∧ ✷C). Hence by Lemma 3.6, HA0 ⊢ ✷m¬ (L = β ∧ ✷C).
Since f
B
(x) ≥ m, we have HAm ⊢ ✷f
B
(x)
(
(L = β ∧ ✷ϕ
β
)→ ¬d(B, β, gˆ
B
(x))
)
, which implies
eq. (5.3).
• B = C → D. In this case β  C ∈ NOI, β 1max D and d(B, β, gˆB (x)) = σHA(C)→ d(D, β, gˆB (x)).
Hence, by induction hypothesis,
HAm ⊢ (F (fE (x)) Rβ ∧ ✷xE)→ ✷fE (x)
(
(L = β ∧✷ϕ
β
)→ ¬d(D, β, gˆ
E
(x))
)
Then by Lemma 5.8,
HAm ⊢ (F (fE (x)) Rβ ∧✷xE)→ ✷fE (x)
(
(L = β ∧ ✷ϕ
β
)→ ¬(C → d(D, β, gˆ
E
(x))
)
• B = C ∧ D. Since β 1max B, either β 1max C or β 1max D holds. We only treat the case that
β 1max C. The other case is similar. Assume that β 1max C. Then by definition, d(B, β, y) =
d(C, β, y). Now the induction hypothesis for C, directly implies the desired result, i.e. eq. (5.3).
• B = C ∨D. This case is the interesting one. We have 4 sub-cases: (1) β 1max C and β 1max D,
(2) not β 1max C and β 1max D, (3) β 1max C and not β 1max D, (4) not β 1max C and not β 1max D.
We only treat the case (3) here. Other cases can be treated similarly. Assume that the case (3)
occurs. By definition, d(B, β, gˆ
E
(x)) = d(C, β, gˆ
E
(x)) ∨ ✷gˆ
E
(x)D. From the induction hypothesis
for C,
(5.4) HAm ⊢ (F (fE (x))Rβ ∧ ✷xE)→ ✷fE (x)
(
(L = β ∧ ✷ϕ
β
)→ ¬d(C, β, gˆ
E
(x))
)
So it is enough to show that
(5.5) HAm ⊢ (F (fE (x))Rβ ∧ ✷xE)→ ✷fE (x)
(
(L = β ∧ ✷ϕ
β
)→ ¬✷gˆ
E
(x)D
)
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Since β 1 D and not β 1max D, there exists some γ 	 β such that γ 1max D. If βR γ, then we can
repeat the reasoning as in the case B = ✷C. So assume that βRγ. By the induction hypothesis
for D and γ, we have
HAm ⊢ (F (fD (x))R γ ∧ ✷xD)→ ✷fD (x)
(
(L = γ ∧ ✷ϕ
γ
)→ ¬d(D, γ, gˆ
D
(x))
)
On the other hand, by Lemma 5.12, we have
HAm ⊢ ✷xD → ✷f
D
(x)d(D, γ, gˆD (x))
Hence
(5.6) HAm ⊢ (F (fD(x))R γ ∧✷xD)→ ✷fD (x)¬(L = γ ∧✷ϕγ )
We argue inside HAm. Assume F (fE (x))Rβ and ✷xE. Since fE (x) ≥ fD(gˆE (x)), by the assump-
tion of F (f
E
(x))Rβ, we have F (f
D
(gˆ
E
(x)))R γ, and by Lemma 3.6, we get✷m(F (fD (gˆE (x)))R γ).
Hence if we replace gˆ
E
(x) for x in eq. (5.6), we may deduce
(5.7) ✷m
(
✷gˆ
E
(x)D → ✷f
D
(gˆ
E
(x))¬(L = γ ∧ ✷ϕγ )
)
Now we work inside ✷f
E
(x). We have F (fE (x))Rβ. Assume ✷gˆE (x)D and L = β and ✷ϕβ .
We should deduce ⊥. From ✷gˆ
E
(x)D and eq. (5.7), we have ✷t(x)¬(L = γ ∧ ✷ϕγ ), in which
t(x) := f
D
(gˆ
E
(x)). So there exists some y1 such that ProofHAt(x)(y1, p¬(L = γ ∧ ϕγ )q). Also by
L = β, there exists some y2 ≥ y1 such that ∀z ≥ y2F (z) = β. Let some y greater than 〈2, γ〉∗y2
and t(x). If r(β, y+1) ≤ t(x), then ✷t(x)¬(L = β∧✷ϕβ ). Now, since fE (x) ≥ hβ(t(x)) and we are
working in ✷f
E
(x), by Lemma 3.12, we have ¬(L = β ∧ ✷ϕβ ) and hence ⊥. If t(x) < r(β, y + 1),
since r(γ, y + 1) ≤ t(x), by recursive definition of F , then F (y + 1) = γ, which contradicts with
L = β.
✷
Corollary 5.14. For each B ∈ Sub(Γ) ∩ TNNIL and β ∈ K such that β 1max B,
HAm ⊢ (F (fB (x)) Rβ ∧✷xB)→ ✷fB (x)¬
(
L = β ∧ ✷ϕ
β
)
Proof. Use Lemma 5.13 for E = B. Then by eq. (5.3) and Lemma 5.12, one can deduce the desired
result. ✷
Theorem 5.15. For each B ∈ Sub(Γ) ∩ TNNIL and α ∈ K such that α 1 ✷B,
HA ⊢ L=α→ ¬✷B
Proof. From α 1 ✷B, we conclude that there exists some β ∈ K such that αRβ and β 1max B. Now
Corollary 5.14 implies HA ⊢ (L = α∧✷B)→ ✷¬(L = β ∧✷ϕ
β
). On the other hand, by Lemma 5.6,
HA ⊢ L = α→ ¬✷¬(L = β ∧✷ϕ
β
). Hence HA ⊢ (L = α ∧ ✷B)→ ⊥, as desired. ✷
5.4 The Solovay function is a constant function
In this subsection, we will show that L = α0 is a true statement in the standard model (The-
orem 5.26). This fact is necessary for showing that for any α ∈ K, the theory L = α + PA is
consistent.
Lemma 5.16. For each α  β ∈ K with αRβ,
HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = α→ ✷+¬(L = β ∧ ✷ϕ
β
)
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Proof. By Π2 conservativity of PA over HA, it is enough to prove the above assertion in PA instead
of HA. We work inside PA. Fix some x such that F (x) = α. Then for each y ≤ x, we have F (y) 4 α.
Now, work inside ✷+. Assume L = β and ✷ϕ
β
. Then there exists some minimum z such that
F (z + 1) = β. So there exists some δ such that F (z) = δ. Since F (x) = α, we have β 	 δ ≥ α.
Hence δRβ. So by recursive definition of F , r(β, z + 1) < r(δ, z + 1) and F (r(β, z + 1))Rβ. Since
αRβ, we have F (r(β, z + 1))  F (x) = α, which implies r(β, z + 1) < x. Since x ≤ z, we have
r(β, z + 1) < z and hence ✷x¬(L = β ∧ ✷ϕβ ). Thus by Lemma 3.7, ¬(L = β ∧ ✷ϕβ ), that is a
contradiction. ✷
Lemma 5.17. For any β ∈ K and B ∈ Sub(Γ) ∩ TNNIL,
• if β  B, then HA ⊢ (L = β ∧✷ϕ
β
)→ B,
• if β 1 B and any occurrence of → in B is in the scope of some ✷ (B ∈ NOI), then
HA ⊢ (L = β ∧✷ϕ
β
)→ ¬B.
Proof. We prove both items by induction on the complexity of B.
• B is atomic. Then, by definition of the substitution σ, HA ⊢ B ↔
∨
γB ∃xF (x) = γ. If
β  B, then HA ⊢ L = β → B. If β 1 B, then for each γ  B, we have γ  β, and hence by
Lemma 5.5 item 1, HA ⊢ L = β → ¬∃xF (x) = γ . Hence HA ⊢ L = β → ¬B.
• B is a conjunction or disjunction. We have the desired conclusions by the induction hypotheses.
• B = ✷C. First assume β  ✷C. Then, by definition of ϕ
β
, C is a conjunct of ϕ
β
, and then
HA ⊢ (L = β ∧ ✷ϕ
β
) → B. For the other side, assume β 1 ✷C. Then Theorem 5.15 implies
HA ⊢ L = β → ¬✷C.
• B = C → D. Since B is TNNIL, we have C ∈ NOI. First assume that β  C → D. If β  C,
then β  D, and hence by the induction hypothesis,
HA ⊢ (L = β ∧✷ϕ
β
)→ (C → D).
If β 1 C, then again by the induction hypothesis, HA ⊢ (L = β ∧ ✷ϕ
β
) → ¬C, and hence
HA ⊢ (L = β ∧✷ϕ
β
)→ (C → D).
✷
Lemma 5.18. Let α ∈ K and for each β ≥ α, we have HA ⊢ βRL → ϕ
β
. Then for each β ≥ α
and γ 	 β such that βRγ, we have
HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = β → ✷+L 6= γ
Proof. Fix some β ≥ α. We use induction on γ. Suppose that for each γ0 	 γ 	 β with βRγ0, we
have HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = β → ✷+L 6= γ0. Then
HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = β → ✷+¬(L = γ ∧ ✷ϕ
γ
) Lemma 5.16
HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = β → ✷+((∃xF (x) = γ ∧ ✷ϕ
γ
)→ L 6= γ)
HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = β → ✷+((∃xF (x) = γ ∧ ✷ϕ
γ
)→ γRL) induction hypothesis and neatness
HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = β → ✷(∃xF (x) = γ → (✷ϕ
γ
→ ϕ
γ
)) hypothesis of lemma and Lemma 3.2
HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = β → ✷(∃xF (x) = γ → ✷ϕ
γ
) Lo¨b’s axiom, Σ1-completeness of HA
This in combination with HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = β → ✷+¬(L = γ ∧ ✷ϕ
γ
) implies
HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = β → ✷+L 6= γ
✷
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Lemma 5.19. For any γ ∈ K0, PA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ → ✷+¬(L = γ ∧ ✷ϕγ ).
Proof. We work inside PA. Assume ∃xF (x) = γ. There exists a minimum x0 such that F (x0) = γ.
Then by recursive definition of F , we have F (x) ≺ F (x0) for all x < x0, and F (x0−˙1) = β, and one
of the following cases holds:
1. βR γ and r(γ, x0) ≤ x0, by definition of r, we can deduce
∃x ≤ x0 ProofPA(x, p¬(L = γ ∧ ϕγ )q)
and then ✷+¬(L = γ ∧ ✷ϕ
γ
).
2. βRγ, β ≺ γ and r(γ, x0) < r(β, x0). Because r(β, x0) ≤ x0 + 1, we can deduce r(γ, x0) ≤ x0.
By repeating the above argument, we get ✷+¬(L = γ ∧ ✷ϕ
γ
).
✷
Lemma 5.20. Let β ∈ K0 and for each γ ≥ β, we have HA ⊢ γRL → ϕγ . Then for each γ ≥ β,
we have HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ → ✷ϕ
γ
.
Proof. By Lemma 5.19, PA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ → ✷+¬(L = γ ∧ ✷ϕ
γ
). Then Lemma 3.2 implies
HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ → ✷+¬(L = γ ∧ ✷ϕ
γ
)
Hence
HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ → ✷+(✷ϕ
γ
→ L 6= γ)
→ ✷+(✷ϕ
γ
→ L ≻ γ)(by Σ1-completeness and Lemma 5.5)
→ ✷+(✷ϕ
γ
→ γRL)(by Lemma 5.18 and Lemma 5.5)
→ ✷(✷ϕ
γ
→ γRL)(by Π2-conservativity of PA over HA)
→ ✷(✷ϕ
γ
→ ϕ
γ
)(by hypothesis)
→ ✷ϕ
γ
(Lo¨b’s axiom)
✷
Lemma 5.21. Let β ∈ K0 and let for each γ ≥ β, we have HA ⊢ γRL→ ϕγ . Then for each γ ≥ β
and B ∈ Sub(Γ) ∩ TNNIL, γ  B implies HA ⊢ ∃xF (x)=γ → B.
Proof. We prove this by induction on the frame (K,) with reverse order. Let some γ ≥ β and
as the (first) induction hypothesis, assume that for each γ0 	 γ and B ∈ Sub(Γ) ∩ TNNIL, if
γ0  B, then HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ0 → B. We will show that for each B ∈ Sub(Γ) ∩ TNNIL, if γ  B,
then HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ → B. We prove this by a (second) induction on the complexity of B ∈
Sub(Γ)∩TNNIL. Let some B ∈ Sub(Γ)∩TNNIL and γ  B and as the (second) induction hypothesis,
assume that for each C ∈ Sub(Γ)∩TNNIL with lower complexity than B (i.e. C is a strict sub-formula
of B) such that γ  C, we have HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ → C. We will show HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ → B. We
have following cases.
• B is atomic. It is trivial by definition of B.
• B is conjunction or disjunction. The result follows easily by (second) induction hypothesis.
• B = ✷C. Suppose that γ  ✷C. Then by definition of ϕ
γ
, we have HA ⊢ ✷ϕ
γ
→ ✷C. Now the
result is a consequence of Lemma 5.20.
• B = C → D ∈ Sub(Γ) ∩TNNIL and C does not have an occurrence of implication which is not in
the scope of any box. Suppose that γ  C → D. There are two sub-cases.
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1. γ  C. Then, by (second) induction hypothesis, we can derive HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ → D, and
hence HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ → (C → D).
2. γ 1 C. Then Lemma 5.17 implies that HA ⊢ (L = γ ∧ ✷ϕ
γ
) → ¬C, and by Lemma 5.20,
HA ⊢ L = γ → ¬C. Now we have HA ⊢ C → L 6= γ and hence
HA ⊢ (∃xF (x) = γ ∧ C)→ L 6= γ
So PA ⊢ (∃xF (x) = γ ∧ C)→ L 6= γ. Then by Lemma 5.5 item 3
PA ⊢ (∃xF (x) = γ ∧C)→ L ≻ γ
On the other hand, C is implication-free and C is Σ1, so by Lemma 3.2, we have HA ⊢
(∃xF (x) = γ ∧ C) → L ≻ γ. For arbitrary γ0 	 γ, we have γ0  C → D. So by the first
induction hypothesis, we can derive HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ0 → (C → D). By definition of γ ≺ L,
we have HA ⊢ γ ≺ L→ (C → D). Hence HA ⊢ (∃xF (x) = γ ∧ C) → (C → D), which implies
HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = γ → (C → D).
✷
Lemma 5.22. For any α ∈ K, HA ⊢ αRL→ ϕ
α
.
Proof. Our proof is by reverse induction on the frame (K,). As the induction hypothesis, assume
that for each β 	 α, we have HA ⊢ βRL → ϕ
β
. For each β with αRβ, by definition of ϕ
α
, we
have β  ϕ
α
. Hence by the induction hypothesis and Lemma 5.21, HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = β → ϕ
α
. Then
HA ⊢
∨
αR β ∃xF (x) = β → ϕα , which implies HA ⊢ αRL→ ϕα . ✷
As a direct consequence of Lemma 5.20 and Lemma 5.22 we have the following result.
Corollary 5.23. For any α ∈ K0, HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = α→ ✷ϕα .
Lemma 5.24. Let α ∈ K and N |= L = α. Then HA ⊢ α ≺ L→ αRL.
Proof. Assume α  β and αRβ. Lemma 5.22 implies that for each γ ≥ α, HA ⊢ γRL → ϕ
γ
.
So Lemma 5.18 implies HA ⊢ L = α → ✷+L 6= β. Then N |= L = α → ✷+L 6= β, which
implies PA ⊢ L 6= β. Hence PA ⊢ α ≺ L → αRL. Now by Π2-conservativity of PA over HA,
HA ⊢ α ≺ L→ αRL. ✷
Lemma 5.25. Let α ∈ K and N |= L=α. Then PA ∪ {L=α,✷ϕ
α
} is consistent.
Proof. Suppose not, i.e., PA ⊢ (L = α∧✷ϕ
α
)→ ⊥. Then PA ⊢ ✷ϕ
α
→ L 6= α. By Σ1-completeness
of PA, we have PA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = α and then by Lemma 5.5, PA ⊢ ✷ϕ
α
→ L ≻ α. By Π2-conservativity
of PA over HA, HA ⊢ ✷ϕ
α
→ L ≻ α. Lemma 5.24 implies HA ⊢ ✷ϕ
α
→ αRL. Then by Lemma 5.22,
HA ⊢ ✷ϕα → ϕα. Then by Lo¨b’s theorem, HA ⊢ ϕα. Hence HA ⊢ ✷ϕα . That implies PA ⊢ L 6= α,
a contradiction with N |= L = α. ✷
Theorem 5.26. N |= L = α0.
Proof. Suppose not, i.e., N |= L 6= α0. Then by Lemma 5.5 items 2 and 3, N |= L = α, for some α >
α0. By Lemma 5.19, N |= ∃xF (x) = α→ ✷+¬(L = α ∧ ✷ϕα). This implies PA ⊢ ¬(L = α ∧ ✷ϕα),
a contradiction with Lemma 5.25. ✷
Corollary 5.27. For any α ≤ β ∈ K we have (L = α ∧ ϕ
α
)✄ (L = β ∧ ϕ
β
).
Proof. We should show that N |= (L = α ∧ ϕ
α
) ✄ (L = β ∧ ϕ
β
). This is a direct consequence of
Theorem 5.26, Lemma 5.7 and Lemma 5.6. ✷
41
5.5 Proof of the main theorem
In this subsection, we will prove Theorem 5.1.
With the general method of constructing Kripke models for HA, invented by Smoryn´ski [Smo73b],
interpretability of theories containing PA plays an important role in constructing Kripke models
of HA.
Definition 5.28. A triple I := (K,<, T ) is called an I-frame iff it has the following properties:
• (K,<) is a finite tree,
• T is a function from K to arithmetical r.e. consistent theories containing PA,
• if β < γ, then Tβ interprets Tγ (Tβ ✄ Tγ ).
Theorem 5.29. For every I-frame I := (K,<, T ) there exists a first-order Kripke model K =
(K,<,M) such that K  HA and moreover M(α) |= Tα, for any α ∈ K. Note that both of the
I-frame and Kripke model are sharing the same frame (K,<).
Proof. See [Smo73b, page 372-7]. For more detailed proof of a generalization of this theorem, see
[AM14, Theorem 4.8]. ✷
Lemma 5.30. For any β ∈ K0, let Tβ := PA ∪ {L=β} and define I := (K0, <0, T ). Then
1. I is an I-frame.
2. There exists a first-order Kripke model K1 := (K0, <0,M) of HA such that for all β ∈ K0 and
B ∈ Sub(Γ), K0, β  B iff K1, β  σHA(B).
Proof. 1. Corollary 5.27 implies that for each α ≤ β, Tα ✄ Tβ. Moreover, Lemma 5.25 implies that
Tα0 is consistent. These finish the requirements of I to be an I-frame.
2. By Theorem 5.29, we can find a first-order Kripke model K1 := (K0, <0,M), such that for all
β ∈ K0, M(β) |= Tβ and K1  HA. Now we prove, by induction on the complexity of B ∈ Sub(Γ),
that for all β ∈ K0, K0, β  B iff K1, β  σHA(B).
• B is atomic. Then by definition, σ
HA
(B) :=
∨
γB L  γ. For left to right direction, let β  B.
By second part of Lemma 5.5, Tβ ⊢
∨
γB L  γ and hence M(β) |=
∨
γB L  γ. Since∨
γB L  γ is Σ1-formula, by Lemma 3.8, we have β 
∨
γB L  γ. For the other way
around, let β 1 B. Then Lemma 5.5 item 2 implies Tβ ⊢ ¬L  γ, for all γ  B. This implies
that M(β) 6|= L  γ, which by use of Lemma 3.8 implies β 1 L  γ. So β 1
∨
γB L  γ.
• B is conjunction, disjunction or implication. Result follows easily by induction hypothesis and
inductive definition of .
• B = ✷C. Let β  B. Then by definition of ϕ
β
and Corollary 5.23, Tβ ⊢ σHA(✷C), and so
M(β) |= σ
HA
(✷C). By Lemma 3.8, β  σ
HA
(✷C). For the other way around, suppose β 1 ✷C.
Then Theorem 5.15 implies Tβ ⊢ ¬σHA(✷C) and hence M(β) 6|= σHA(✷C). Then Lemma 3.8
implies β 1 σ
HA
(✷C).
✷
Proof. (of Theorem 5.1) Let σ be the substitution that we have defined at the beginning of this
section and K1 be as we have by Lemma 5.30. Then the assertion of Lemma 5.30 implies that for
any A ∈ Sub(Γ) we have:
K0, α  A iff K1, α  σHA(A)
✷
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6 The Σ1-provability logic of HA
In this section, we will show that PLσ(HA) = iHσ (see Definition 2.2). Moreover, we will show that
iHσ is decidable. As a by-product of Theorem 5.1, we show that HA + ✷⊥ has de Jongh property.
Before we continue with the statement and proof of soundness and completeness theorems, let us
apply our techniques presented in this paper to Examples 1.2 and 1.3 in section 1.
Example 6.1. Let A = ✷(p ∨ q) → (✷p ∨ ✷q). We will refute the modal proposition A from the
provability logic (and Σ1-provability logic) of HA.
First of all note that the Kripke model K0 from Example 1.2 is a counter-model for A. Then
by Theorem 5.1, there exists some first-order Kripke model K1  HA and some Σ1-substitution σ
such that K1 1 σHA(A). Hence we have HA 0 σHA(A), in other words, if we define B := σ(p) and
C := σ(q), then we have HA 0 ✷(B ∨ C)→ (✷B ∨✷C).
Example 6.2. In this example, we show that how to refute A = ¬¬✷(¬¬p → p) → ✷(¬¬p → p)
from the provability logic of HA and also from the Σ1-provability logic of HA. First we compute the
TNNIL-approximation ofA, i.e. A+. By TNNIL-algorithm (Section 4.1.3), A+=✷(p ∨ ¬p) ∨ ¬✷(p ∨ ¬p).
Then K0 from Example 1.3 is a countermodel for A+. Then by Theorem 5.1, there exists some
first-order Kripke model K1  HA and some Σ1-substitution σ such that K1 1 σHA(A
+). Hence
HA 0 σ
HA
(A+). Since HA ⊢ σ
HA
(✷A↔ ✷A+) (Corollary 4.8), we can deduce HA 0 σ
HA
(A).
Soundness
Theorem 6.3. iHσ is sound for Σ1-arithmetical interpretations in HA, i.e. iHσ ⊆ PLσ(HA).
Proof. We must show that Σ1-interpretations of all axioms of iHσ hold in HA. For a proof that
Σ1-interpretations of axioms ✷A → ✷B with A ◮ B, hold in HA, see [Vis02], Theorem 10.2. The
other axioms are well-known or obvious, except for the Extended Leivant’s principle, which holds
by Theorem 3.19. ✷
The following corollary, shows that LC captures the TNNIL part of the theory iHσ. In other
words, as far as we are interested in TNNIL propositions, we can work with the rather simple theory
LC instead of iHσ.
Corollary 6.4. For any TNNIL modal proposition A, LC ⊢ A if and only if iHσ ⊢ A.
Proof. The deduction from left to right is by Theorem 4.24 and the fact that iHσ ⊢ LLe+, which holds
by definition of iHσ. For the right to left direction, assume that LC 0 A. Then by Theorem 4.26,
there exists some Kripke model K0 such that K0 1 A. Then by Theorem 5.1, we can find some
Σ1-substitution σ and some first-order Kripke model K1, such that K1  HA and K1 1 σHA(A).
Hence HA 0 σ
HA
(A). Now Theorem 6.3 implies that iHσ 0 A, as desired. ✷
Completeness
Theorem 6.5. iHσ is complete for Σ1-arithmetical interpretations in HA, i.e.
PLσ(HA) ⊆ iHσ
Proof. Let iHσ 0 A. Then by Corollary 4.19, iHσ 0 A−. Then by Theorem 4.5 item 1, iHσ 0 (A−)∗,
which implies iHσ 0 A+. Hence LLe+ 0 A+ and by Theorem 4.24, LC 0 A+. Then by Theorem 4.26,
there exists some Kripke model K0 such that K0 1 A+. Then by Theorem 5.1, we can find some
Σ1-substitution σ and some first-order Kripke model K1, such that K  HA and K 1 σHA(A
+).
Hence HA 0 σ
HA
(A+). Now Corollary 4.8 item 1 implies HA 0 σ
HA
(A), as desired. ✷
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Although the axioms of the theory iHσ sounds very complicated, however we have the following
surpring result.
Theorem 6.6. The Σ1-provability logic of HA (iHσ) is decidable.
Proof. Let A be a given modal proposition. We explain how to decide iHσ ⊢ A or iHσ 0 A. First by
TNNIL algorithm, compute A+. Then by Corollary 4.27, we can decide LC ⊢ A+. If LC ⊢ A+ , we
say ‘yes” to iHσ ⊢ A, and otherwise we say “no” to iHσ ⊢ A. Corollary 6.4 guarantees validity of the
algorithm.
✷
Theorem 6.7. HA+✷⊥ has the de Jongh property, i.e. for all non-modal proposition A, IPC ⊢ A
iff for all arithmetical substitution σ, HA+✷⊥ ⊢ σ(A).
Proof. If IPC ⊢ A, we apparently have HA ⊢ σ(A), for all σ, and hence HA+✷⊥ ⊢ σ(A).
For the other way around, let IPC 0 A. Hence by Theorem 4.5 item 1, IPC 0 A∗. Then by
Theorem 4.28, LC 0 ✷⊥ → A∗. This implies that LLe+ 0 ✷⊥ → A∗. Hence by Theorem 5.1, there
exists some substitution σ such that HA+✷⊥ 0 σ(A), as desired. ✷
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